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INTRODUCTION

The labels of lease and sale often attach to transactions with
only subtle economic differences that, for tax purposes, engender divergent consequences. In a lease, under section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, rentals are gross income to the lessor;" they
are deductible by the lessee as a current expense under section
162(a)(3).2 Conversely, in a sale, only the gain - the excess of
amount realized over adjusted basis - is taxable to the seller, 3 and
the cost to the buyer is capitalized and recovered over the period
prescribed by section 168. Each of these transactions, though different in character, share many similarities. 4 As a result the courts
1. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (1982) [hereinafter all section references will be to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 (I.R.C.) unless otherwise specified]. The Internal Revenue Code is
codified at 26 U.S.C.
2. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982).
3. I.R.C. §§ 1001 (determination of the amount of and recognition of gain or loss), 1011
(adjusted basis for determining gain or loss), 1012 (basis of property-cost), 1016 (adjustments
to basis) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
4. A lease and a conditional sale, for example, both call for the transfer of possession of
property to one party, either the lessee or vendee, in exchange for periodic payments to the
other party. A conditional sale transfers title from the vendor to the vendee upon completion of
the installment payments, whereas a lease requires the lessee to relinquish possession at the
expiration of the lease term. The critical difference is that, after all payments under the contract are made, the lessee relinquishes possession of the property in a lease, unlike the buyer
who, in a conditional sale, retains possession.
Similarly, in a sale and leaseback, the property owner conveys ownership to a party, who
then leases the asset back to the original owner for a specified term. See Reisman & Mooney,
Drafting, Negotiating, and Construing the Equipment Lease - An Overview in EQUIPMENT
LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 30-31 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980). Physical possession does not change hands, at least for the length of the lease term. See generally Frank Lyon
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have difficulty identifying the true owner of the property, and thus,
the proper tax label.
The types of leases and lease provisions that challenge the traditional distinction between lease and sale are numerous. For example,
the tax treatment of long term leases is frequently challenged on the
ground that the lessor retains too insubstantial a residual interest in
the leased asset to accord tax significance.5 Open-end leases, commonly involving motor vehicles, are often challenged on the ground
that the lessee bears the entire risk of fluctuation in residual value.
Lease provisions that blur the distinction between a lease and a sale
include fixed price purchase options, 7 put options, 8 extended renewal
options, 9 and residual sharing arrangements with lessees and third
parties. 10
The objective of this Article is to offer a more definitive standard for determining the tax consequences of a lease. Most courts
currently apply an economic substance test" to determine the tax
treatment of a lease. 2 The content of the test is the subject of much
dispute in the case law,1 3 Internal Revenue Service pronounceCo. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). A mortgage loan contemplates the transfer of legal
title to property to a mortgagee as security for a loan. See W. WALSH, MORTGAGES §6 (1934).
The mortgagor retains physical possession and equitable title, and repays the loan through
periodic installments. The major distinction between a sale and leaseback and mortgage loan is
that the latter returns legal ownership to the mortgagor after the loan is paid off, whereas the
former requires the vendor-lessee to completely sever his ownership interest in the property
despite his ensuing leasehold interest.
5. See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 120-26, 135-38 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text.
10. See Simonson, Determining Tax Ownership of Leased Property, 38 TAx LAv. 1, 16
(1985).
I1. This test also is referred to as the risk/benefit test and the burden/benefit test. See
Sun Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977). This author prefers the phrase
economic substance test, and for sake of uniformity, the term will be used throughout this
Article.
12. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Transamerica
Corp. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 441 (1985); Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412
(1985); Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1067 (1981);
Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), affd per curiam, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982);
Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), rev'd, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982); Hilton v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), af'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 907 (1982); Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), aftid, 661 F.2d 76
(6th Cir. 1981).
13. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12.
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ments,"4 legislative enactments"5 and legal literature.1" In order to
accord lease treatment, courts have to identify the relevant incidents

of ownership and weigh their allocation to ensure that the lessor possesses the more substantial sum.' 7 Because virtually all leases afford
the lessee some incident of ownership,"' the weighing aspect of the
test is crucial.
The thesis of this Article is twofold: First, the economic sub14. Compare Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39 with Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66
and Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 12, 32, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 494, 503, 530 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168 & note (West Supp.
1985)); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 209, 10, 96
Stat. 324, 442-48 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 48, 168 & 168 note (West Supp. 1985)).
See, e.g., I S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 781; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N. 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., ANALYSIS OF SAFEHARBOR LEASING (Joint Comm. Print. 1982).
16. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Sale and Leaseback: A Hollow Sound When Tapped? 37 TAX
L. REV. 1 (1981); Fuller, Sales And Leasebacks And The Frank Lyon Case, 48 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 60 (1979); Kronovet, Characterizationof Real Estate Leases: An Analysis and Proposal, 32 TAX LAW. 757 (1979); Rosenberg & Weinstein, Applying the Tax Court's nontax
benefit test for multiple-party sale-leasebacks, 54 J. TAX'N 366 (1981); Simonson, supra note
10; Wolfman, The Supreme Court in The Lyon's Den A Failure Of Judicial Process, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981); Note, "Safe Harbor"As Tax Reform: Taxpayer Election of
Lease Treatment, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1648 (1982); Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback
Transactions -

A General Review, 32 VAND. L. REV. 945 (1979).

17. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 581-83 (1978). The Court first
listed 6 factors which supported the Government's position that the lessee was the true owner,
and then listed 26 factors which highlighted the taxpayer's contention that it was the owner.
Id. at 583. The Court never specifically stated that a balancing test was being applied. Nonetheless, the Court's test tipped the scales in favor of the lessor by permitting form to govern
tax consequences "so long as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status," rather than requiring the lessor to retain more ownership attributes than
the lessee. Id. at 584.
Other "economic substance courts" have implicitly adopted a balancing test. These courts,
like the Lyon Court, engage in a broad-ranging factor-by-factor survey of all relevant lease
provisions, in order to gauge the economics of the transaction. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980),
afd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446 (1949). Still other economic substance courts have focused on one or
two critical features of the transaction. See, e.g., Beus v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 176 (9th
Cir. 1958); Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956); Judson Mills v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 25 (1948). One explanation for the different approaches is that the first set of
cases concerns the lessor's depreciation deduction, whereas the second set concerns the lessees
rental deduction. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
18. For example, the lessee assumes the risks and benefits of fluctuations in fair rental
value over the life of the lease. Most leases fix the lessee's rental payment. If the fair rental
value subsequently increases and the lease permits subletting arrangements, the lessee, rather
than the lessor, has the beneficial enjoyment of the spread between fair rental value and the
stipulated rental. Likewise, the lessee of a noncancellable lease bears the risk of subsequent
decline in the rental value.
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stance test, properly articulated and applied, correctly identifies the
tax owner of the property; other tests developed by courts are illsuited to determine true ownership. Three prongs of the economic
substance test will be defined and their interrelationships explained:
1) the risk of residual value fluctuation; 9 2) the right to possession
for substantially all the property's useful life;"0 and 3) the risk of
depreciable loss.21 If the lease allocates either the first or second element to the lessee, then the lessee is the true owner and the transaction should be reclassified by the Internal Revenue Service. If the
lease allocates the third element to the lessee, the lessee should be
accorded true owner status only if the lease requires the lessee to
replace the property or restores it to its original value.
Secondly, this Article demonstrates that Congress erred in the
formulation of new "finance lease" rules in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.22 Because Congress has departed
from its declared goal of restoring economic substance as the determinant of tax treatment, the repeal of the finance lease rules is
necessary.
A transactional approach to lease analysis23 is preferable to the
deduction-oriented approach characterizing much of the case law.
Such an approach would allow examination of the substance of the
entire transaction and can be applied to either the lessor or lessee.
This Article will examine the statutory and judicial requirements
necessary for development of a transactional test. The test will focus
on the substance of a transaction rather than its form, and will be
completely neutral to the labels employed by the parties. The deter19.
20.
21.

See infra notes 120-83 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 184-218 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-72 and accompanying text. The risk of depreciable loss refers

here to the risk of excessive depreciation or obsolescence.
22.

Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 342 (1982).

23.

Some definitions would be helpful. The "deduction-oriented approach" refers to the

method of analysis developed by courts to determine a taxpayer's entitlement to a deduction

generated by participation in a leasing transaction. The Internal Revenue Service typically
challenges the tax treatment of a leasing transaction by denying the deduction or credit of a
party to the transaction, e.g., the lessee's rent deduction, or the lessor's depreciation deduction
or investment tax credit. The courts apply the test that governs the particular deduction or
credit at issue without necessarily considering whether the transaction as a whole ought to be

treated as a lease or sale. This narrow focus leaves open the possibility for asymmetrical tests
governing the lessee and lessor; indeed, the tests are theoretically asymmetrical. See supra

notes 151-60 and accompanying text. The "transactional approach," on the other hand, offers
a clear and uniform definition of a true lease to govern the tax consequences of the various

parties to the transaction, thus promoting certainty in tax planning and consistent application
by the courts.
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mination that the lessor or the lessee is the tax owner will be made
by weighing the incidents of ownership held by each party, i.e., by
utilizing a pure balancing test. Only one of the three prongs of this
economic substance test, however, need point to sale treatment to

result in a transfer of ownership for tax purposes. This contradiction
is easily resolved. If one of the three prongs of the test is satisfied,
the critical incidents of ownership - the benefit of appreciation and
the burden of decline in the value of the property - are transferred.
II.

THE TAX TREATMENT OF LEASES: AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN
THE DECISION TO LEASE

The tax treatment of leases plays a prominent role in the lease

versus purchase decision. 4 For example, rental income is ordinary
income, 25 gain from a sale may qualify for capital gains treatment, 2
and borrowing and repaying principal on a mortgage loan are not
taxed at all.27 While the timing of cost recovery deductions on property is generally independent of cash outlays, 28 the timing of rent29
and interest 0 deductions are more flexible. Furthermore, the deduct-

ibility of rent on land offers lessees an added advantage over their
24. See generally Ahlstrom & Bole, Economics of Leveraged Leasing, in EQUIPMENT
LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 627-80 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980).
25. Rent proceeds are gross income under I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (1982).
26. The property must constitute a "capital asset" as defined in I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) or
a "section 1231 asset" defined in I.R.C. § 1231(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1985). The absence of
a "sale or exchange" prevents capital gains treatment.
27. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 3.01 (3d ed. 1982).
28. In I.R.C. § 168(b) (West Supp. 1985), the Accelerated Cost Recovery System recovery schedules are independent of the timing of installment payments, which may be spread
out over a much longer time period than the applicable recovery period in I.R.C. § 168(c)
(West Supp. 1985). The only limitations on the timing of cost recovery deductions for corporate taxpayers are: I.R.C. § 465 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (at-risk rules); I.R.C. § 1366(d)
(1982) (basis limitation on loss pass-through in S corporation); and the "prudent abandonment" doctrine of Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (limited
partnership).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11, 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.162-11 (1984), requires the lessee to prorate
prepaid rent over the length of the lease term. See also Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56.
Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 5.01, 1975-1 C.B. 715, 716-17, liberalizes this requirement by permitting
rent payments to fluctuate ten percent above or below an evenly prorated rental stream. But
see I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1985), discussed infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
30. I.R.C. § 461(g) (1982) prohibits cash basis taxpayers from deducting prepaid interest. Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97, 99, requires accrual basis taxpayers to follow economic
accrual concepts in computing interest deductions. I.R.C. § 483 (1982), before the amendments by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, permitted straight line allocations on a pro rata basis
among the total § 483 payments of "unstated" interest. See Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(a) (1966)
(3d sentence in particular). New § 483(a) (Vest Supp. 1985), however, requires an economic
accrual of interest consistent with I.R.C. § 1272(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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purchaser counterparts, who are unable to recover purchase payments until they dispose of the land.3

Passage of new sections 46732 and 1274,3 3 and the overhaul of
section 483 by the Tax Reform Act of 19843' have altered the consequences of the lease versus buy decision. Section 467 introduces time
value of money concepts into leasing transactions. The provision applies to lease transactions involving payments in excess of $250,0003'

which call for deferred or uneven rent. Depending upon the type and
nature of the transaction,36 and the presence of the ever-fatal tax

avoidance purpose, 37 section 467 may require rent leveling based on
present value concepts, accrual of interest on accrued but unpaid
rents, or recapture of some capital gain as ordinary income on disposition by a lessor of leased property.38 Sections 483 and 1274, on the
other hand, extend application of the original issue discount (OID)
rules 39 to debt issued for nontraded property.40 Section 1274 generally applies to transactions involving payments in excess of $250,000;
OID accrues according to a constant economic interest formula .4
OID computations under section 483 are similar to those under sec31. Land has an indeterminate useful life, and is therefore nondepreciable. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (1956).
32. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 92(a), 1984 US. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494, 609 (codified at I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1985)).
33. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(a), 1984 US. CODE CONG &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494, 531 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 1271-1278, 1281-1283, 1286-1288 (West
Supp. 1985)).
34. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 41(b), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494, 553 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 485 (West Supp. 1985)).
35. 1.R.C. § 467(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
36. Types of transactions include a "disqualified leaseback or long-term agreement,"
I.R.C. § 467(b)(4) (West Supp. 1985), or more generally, a "section 467 rental agreement," §
467(d)(1) (West Supp. 1985). For discussion of § 467, see J. EusrlcE, THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1984 - A SELECTIVE ANALYSIS 2-43 to 2-51 (1984); Flowers, Section 467: Tying Down
the Open Issues, 3 J. EQUIP. LEASE FIN. 9 (1985); Hamilton & Comi, The Time Value of
Money: Section 467 Rental Agreements Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 63 TAXES 155
(1985).
37. I.R.C. § 467(b)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
38. See generally J. EusTicE, supra note 36; Hamilton & Comi, supra note 36.
39. Prior to the 1984 amendments, the OlD rules were found in I.R.C. §§ 1232 and
1232A (1982).
40. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98th CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT of 1984 108-21
(Joint Comm. Print. 1984) [hereinafter cited as General Explanation]. See also Sheffield, Debt
Issued for Traded and Nontraded Property, 62 TAXEs 1022 (1984).
41. See I.R.C. § 1272(a) (West Supp. 1985). A set of transitional rules applies to sales
or exchanges before July 1, 1985, of certain property subject to § 483 or § 1274; these rules
lower the imputed interest and test rates. See Act of Oct. 31, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-612, § 2,
98 Stat. 3180, 3182 (codified as a note to I.R.C. § 1271 (West Supp. 1985)).
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tion 1274; however, OID accrues under section 483 as installment
payments are made.42
Three areas of the Internal Revenue Code pertain to lease
transactions. First, section 162(a)(3) prescribes the requirements for
the lessee's entitlement to the rent deduction:
(a) In General - There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including (3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not
taking title or in which he has no equity.4"
This provision imposes three restrictions on the lease transaction:
The rentals must be for continued use or possession of the property
in a trade or business; the lessor must retain title; and the lessee may
not acquire an equity 44 in the property.
Secondly, section 167(a) provides the statutory authority for the
lessor's depreciation deduction. It states:
(a) General Rule - There shall be allowed as a depreciation
deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear
(including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) (1) of property used in trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.45
The depreciation deduction allows the property owner to recover his
original cost during the useful life of the property.4" Theoretically,
the depreciation deduction should match or approximate the eco42.

I.R.C. § 483(a) (West Supp. 1985).

43. I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982).
44. The definition of "equity" in the context of § 162(a)(3) (1982) is discussed at infra
notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
45. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(b) (1984). Since passage of the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), infra note 49, the cost

of most depreciable property is recovered over a period substantially shorter than its useful
life. See I.R.C. § 168(c) (West Supp. 1985).

Tax law allows cost recovery deductions under I.R.C. §§ 167 and 168 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1985), to the party with an investment in the property. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v.
Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 1976). The true owner for depreciation purposes

must demonstrate "an interest in the property and a present loss by [wear and tear] to him."
Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 336 (1929).
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nomic depreciation of the property; 47 Congress, however, has legis-

lated accelerated deductions for policy reasons.48
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), codified at
section 168, was enacted by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
198 149 (ERTA). ACRS provides a method of depreciation for tangible property placed in service in tax years ending after 1980.50 In
most cases, ACRS greatly increases the rate of cost recovery on depreciable assets.51 Apart from the safe harbor leasing rules modified
by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA), 52 the Code also limits ACRS benefits to the true property

owner.

53

Finally, the Investment Tax Credit (ITC)5 4 offers taxpayers an
incentive to invest in certain types of property. This property, known

as "section 38 property,

' 55

must have an estimated useful life of

three years or more and must be either tangible personal property or
47. One court explained that "[t]he statutory allowance [for depreciation] is available to
him whose interest in the wasting asset is such that he would suffer an economic loss resulting
from the deterioration and physical exhaustion as it takes place." Commissioner v. Moore, 207
F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
48. Congress provided for accelerated depreciation in order to maintain a high level of
capital investment and encourage risk-taking by management. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4655-56. See
also Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation- Tax Expenditure or ProperAllowance for Measuring
Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979).
49. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172 (codias amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
fied
50. Technically, I.R.C. § 167(a) incorporates I.R.C. § 168: "section 168 shall be
deemed to constitute the reasonable allowance provided by this section. . . ." I.R.C. § 167(a)
(1982). The only exclusions from ACRS are (1) for intangible property with a limited useful
life (§ 168(c)(1) (1982) limits ACRS benefits to "tangible property"), see Treas. Reg. §
1.167(a)-3 (1956), and (2) for rehabilitation expenditures for low-income rental housing. See
I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982), (k) (West Supp. 1985). The cost of intangible property with an unlimited useful life is non-recoverable. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956).
51. The present value of ACRS deductions and the investment tax credit are roughly
equivalent to current expensing of depreciable property. See Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe HarborLeasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752,
1754-56 (1982). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§§ 205(a)(1), 209(c), 96 Stat. 324, 427-28, 447 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 48(q),
168(b) (West Supp. 1985)), added a new § 48(q) and repealed the faster recovery schedules in
§ 168(b) to prevent tax benefits from exceeding those of current expensing.
52. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 208, 96 Stat. 324, 432-42 (1982). See infra notes 306-19 and
accompanying text. See generally Warren & Auerbach, supra note 51; Warren & Auerbach,
Tax Policy and Equipment Leasing After TEFRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1983).
53. See supra note 46.
54. I.R.C. §§ 46-48 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
55. I.R.C. § 48(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
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other tangible property used integrally in certain industries. 56 The
Code restricts these tax benefits to the true property owner 57 by linking "section 38 property" to the depreciation deduction.5
The Internal Revenue Service5 9 has issued several Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures on the lease versus sale issue60 and
related considerations. In Revenue Ruling 55-540,1 the Service
dealt comprehensively with the issue as applied to commercial equipment leases. The ruling sets out two guidelines. First, "[w]hether an
agreement, which in form is a lease, is in substance a conditional
sales contract depends upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by
the provisions of the agreement, read in the light of the facts and
circumstances existing at the time the agreement was executed. '62
Second, the Service cautions that, "[n]o general rule, applicable to
all cases, can be laid down." 6 3 Nevertheless, the Service describes
several situations in which a lease will generally be treated as a sale.
A lease will be considered a sale if:
(a) Portions of the periodic payments are made specifically applicable to an equity to be acquired by the lessee.
(b) The lessee will acquire title upon the payment of a stated
amount of "rentals" which under the contract he is required to
make.
(c) The total amount which the lessee is required to pay for a
relatively short period of use constitutes an inordinately large proportion of the total sum required to be paid to secure the transfer
of the title.
(d) The agreed "rental" payments materially exceed the current fair rental value. This may be indicative that the payments
include an element other than compensation for the use of
56.

I.R.C. § 48(a)(I) (1982). The target industries are enumerated in § 48(a)(1) (1982)

and in Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(a) (1984).
57. See supra note 46.
58.

I.R.C. § 48(a)(1) (1982) limits the definition of "section 38 property" to "recovery

property" or any other depreciable property with a useful life of at least 3 years.
59.

Hereinafter all references to the Internal Revenue Service will appear as the IRS or

the Service.
60. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 82-61, 1982-1 C.B. 13; Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87; Rev.
Rul. 72-408, 1972-2 C.B. 86; Rev. Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 C.B. 66; Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-I
C.B. 56; Rev. Rul. 57-371, 1957-2 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 55-542, 1955-2 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 55541, 1955-2 C.B. 19; Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39; Rev. Rul. 55-25, 1955-1 C.B. 283;
Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731; Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529; Rev. Proc. 76-30,
1976-2 C.B. 647; Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752; Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715.
61. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39.
62. Id. § 4.01, at 41.

63. Id.
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property.
(e) The property may be acquired under a purchase option at
a price which is nominal in relation to the value of the property at
the time when the option may be exercised, as determined at the
time of entering into the original agreement, or which is a relatively small amount when compared with the total payments which
are required to be made.
(f) Some portion of the periodic payments is speciffically designated as interest or is otherwise readily recognizable as the
64
equivalent of interest.
[I]t will be presumed that a conditional sales contract was intended if the total of the rental payments and any option price payable in addition thereto approximates the price at which the equipment could have been acquired by purchase at the time of entering
into the agreement, plus interest and/or carrying charges. 65
If the sum of the specified "rentals" over a relatively short
part of the expected useful life of the equipment approximates the
price at which the equipment could have been acquired by
purchase at the time of entering into the agreement, plus interest
and/or carrying charges on such amount, and the lessee may continue to use the equipment for an additional period or periods approximating its remaining estimated useful life for relatively nominal or token payments, it may be assumed that the parties have
entered into a sale contract ....61
Twenty years after the publication of Revenue Ruling 55-540,
the Service released Revenue Procedure 75-21,67 which was intended
to provide a clear set of guidelines indicating when the Service would
be prepared to issue a favorable advanced ruling. The conditions imposed by Revenue Procedure 75-21 are:
(1) The lessor must have an unconditional "at risk" investment
of at least twenty percent of the cost of the property at the beginning
of the lease term, and must maintain a twenty percent minimum "at
64. Id. § 4.01(a)-(f), at 41-42 (citations omitted).
65. Id. § 4.05, at 42.
66. Id. § 4.06, at 42-43.
67. 1975-1 C.B. 715, modified by Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647, Rev. Proc. 79-48,
1979-2 C.B. 529, and Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731 [hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc. 7521]. Prior to the issuance of Rev. Proc. 75-21, the Service required (1) that the lessor make a
20 percent initial equity investment in the property, (2) that the property at the end of the
lease term have a residual value of at least 15 percent of cost, and (3) that the remaining
useful life of the property after the lease equal at least 10 percent of its useful life.
See G.C.M. 34866 (May 2, 1972).
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risk" investment throughout the lease term; 68
(2) The leased property must have a residual value at the end of
the lease term of at least twenty percent of the original cost of the
property, determined without regard to inflation or deflation, and after subtracting 6 the
lessor's removal and delivery costs at the end of
9
the lease term;
(3) The remaining useful life of the property at the end of the
lease term must equal at least one year or twenty percent of the
property's originally estimated useful life, whichever is longer;70
(4) The lessor may not have a fixed price purchase option on the
property; nor may the lessor have a contractual right to cause the
property to be purchased at a fixed price or at fair market value by
7
any other party; '
(5) The lessee, including any party related to the lessee within
the meaning of I.R.C. section 318 (Lessee Group), may not furnish
any part of the cost of the property or improvements, with the exception of certain severable and nonseverable improvements;"2
(6) No member of the Lessee Group may lend any money to or
guarantee any indebtedness of the lessor in connection with the acquisition of the property; 73
(7) The lessor must show that it expects to receive a profit from
the transaction independent of tax benefits;74
(8) To avoid characterization of rent as prepaid or deferred, the
annual rent for any year must equal between 90 and 110 percent of
the average annual rent; however, during the last third of the lease
term, the annual rent must be at least one-half of the average rent,
and may not exceed the highest annual rent, during the first twothirds of the lease term. 75
Although the guidelines do not represent the state of the law on
leasing, most parties engaging in equipment leasing make a serious
effort to comply with them. The courts are considerably more liberal
than the guidelines in many areas, including purchase options and
"at risk" investment. 6
68.

Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(1), 1975-1 C.B. 715.

69. Id., § 4()(C), at 715-16.
70. Id.
71. Id., § 4(3), at 716. This contractual right is called a put option.
72. Id., § 4(4), at 716, modified by Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(5), at 716.
Id., § 4(6), at 716.
Id., § 5.01, at 716.
See, e.g., Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412 (1985) (at risk investment
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III.

ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE: THE DETERMINANT OF TAX
TREATMENT

The past fifty years have witnessed several shifts in the judicial
approach to the lease versus sale issue. The early courts 77 were asked

to construe the legal effect of three types of lease provisions: Fixed
price purchase options, exerciseable either at the end of the lease
term or at specified intervals;" dual-character lease payments,

9

which resemble purchase options, but credit all or a part of lease
rentals toward exercise of the option;8 0 and provisions that automatically transfer title to the lessee after the lease term upon payment of
a set amount of rentals."' Initially, courts looked to the parties' intent to distinguish a lease from a sale.82 Some of these courts focused
of approximately 10 percent; held, true lease and not a mere financing arrangement); LTV
Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974) (where rental payments are comparable to the fair
rental value of the equipment and lessee is not building equity, the contract is a lease); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), affd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222
(9th Cir. 1974) (fixed price purchase options for 10 percent of cost; held, true lease).
77. The earliest cases arose in insolvency settings. See, e.g., Burroughs Adding Mach. v.
Bogdon, 9 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1925); In re Rainey, 31 F.2d 197 (D. Md. 1929); Corbett v.
Riddle, 209 F.811 (4th Cir. 1913) (leases of personalty with the privilege of purchase held
conditional sales). A trustee in bankruptcy could void a conditional contract of sale that was
not recorded prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition; however, the trustee could not void a
lease. The test applied to distinguish between a lease and a conditional sale was "the legal
effect of the instrument as gathered from all of its provisions." Burroughs, 9 F.2d at 56.
This issue still exists under commercial and bankruptcy law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-302, 9114, 1-201(37). See also Leary, The ProcrusteanBed of FinanceLeasing, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1061 (1981). Leary proposes that since the best solution to finance leasing problems are found
in a variety of sources, including in the characteristics of the finance lease itself, finance leasing of equipment should be treated as a sut generis transaction and should be ruled by a
statutory scheme tuned to its unique problems. Id. at 1107.
78. See Rankin v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1932); Judson Mills v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Haverstick v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 837 (1928); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, I1 B.T.A. 547 (1928).
79. See infra text accompanying note 140.
80. See e.g., Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1386 (1954), rev'd,
232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956); Rotorite Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1941);
Goldfields of America, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 200 (1941); Taft v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 808 (1933); Indian Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 950 (1931);
Robertson v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930). For a definition of dual-character lease
payments, see infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Chicago Stoker Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Helser Machine & Marine Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 644 (1939).
82. See, e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932); Rankin v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1932); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1931); Taft v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 808 (1933); Smith v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A.
27 (1930); Robertson v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930); Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, II B.T.A. 547 (1928).
For excellent analysis of the early case law, see Note, Tax Treatment of the Lease With
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largely, if not exclusively, on the written agreement to determine intent, 83 while other courts examined extrinsic evidence such as the
conduct of the parties before contracting and contemporaneous verbal agreements.8 4 Courts that have cast a lease as a sale have held
that the recharacterization applied only as of the year title passed to

the lessee and only to the party before the court.8 5 Other courts,
however, have held that a sale occurred at the time the lease was
entered into, and applied sale treatment to both sides of the

transaction. 86
The Tax Court, citing the taxpayers' need for a fixed rule to
guide tax planning decisions, abandoned the intent test in successive
decisions between 1948 and 1950, and adopted an economic substance test. 87 The new test focused on whether the lessee had ac-

quired an "equity" in the leased property, which was forbidden by
the relevant Code provision. 8 The Fifth Circuit, dissatisfied with the
seeming inflexibility of the new test, rejected the economic substance
test in favor of the
0
Commissioner."

subjective

intent

test

in

Benton v.

The taxpayer in Benton ran a small, but successful taxicab business in Amarillo, Texas.9 0 In early 1945, Mays, an owner of the YelOption to Purchase: Is Allocation the Answer?, 11 TAX L. REv. 65 (1955) and Note, Tax
Treatment of "Lessors" And "Lessees" Under Lease-PurchaseAgreements, 62 YALE L.J. 273

(1953).
83. Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931).
84. See, e.g., Rankin v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1932); Robertson v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930).
85. See, e.g., Goldfields of America, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 200 (1941)
("[s] ince tax deductions by the buyer are controlled by the language of the deduction provision
of the statute, there is no necessary reciprocal relationship between them and the taxation to
the seller of the periodic payments received by him"); Haverstick v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A.
837 (1928) (applying sale treatment at point option exercised).
86. See, e.g., Taft v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 808 (1933) (sale at time of contracting);
Smith v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 27 (1930) (sale at time of contracting; the Board decided
both the lessor and lessee side simultaneously). See also Rotorite Corp. v. Commissioner, 117
F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1941) (applying sale treatment retroactively to beginning of year of option
exercise; court criticized Commissioner's inconsistent treatment of lessor and lessee).
87. Chicago Stoker Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Renner & Maras, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 451 (1950) (following Chicago Stoker); Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446 (1949); Judson Mills v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 25 (1948).
88. I.R.C. § 23(a)(1)(A) (1939 Code) (current version at I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982)).
See cases cited supra note 87.
89. 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952), rev'g, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 811 (1950). The Seventh
Circuit quickly followed suit in Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319
(7th Cir. 1956).
90. 197 F.2d at 753.
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low Cab & Baggage Company of Amarillo (Yellow Cab), the largest
taxicab company in Amarillo, 91 approached Benton and offered to
sell or lease the business to him.92 Benton indicated that he did not
have enough money to purchase the company.9" After several weeks
of negotiations, Benton and Mays entered into a "lease" agreement, 94 in which Benton leased Yellow Cab for a ten month period
at a monthly rental of $5,000."' The agreement extended the option
to purchase the company for $35,000 to Benton, with monthly installment payments of $5,000 plus 6% interest on the deferred installments.96 Although at the time the agreement was executed Benton expressed the hope that he would be able to exercise the
purchase option, 97 a decline in business volume and a cash squeeze
made Benton's exercise of the option infeasible.98 To enable Benton
to exercise the option, Mays formed a partnership with Benton, and
the partnership thereupon exercised the option.99 The Commissioner
denied Benton the rental deduction under section 23(a)(1)(A) of the
1939 Code for the $45,000 of monthly rentals paid in 1945 on the
ground that the lease was in substance a conditional sale. 00°
The Tax Court held in favor of the Commissioner.' 0 ' The court
applied an economic test, comparing the value of the property with
the option price. Under the Tax Court's test, if the option price exceeded the property value, lease status would prevail; if the property
value exceeded the option price, the lessee would possess an equity in
the property, converting the agreement into a conditional sale. The
Tax Court found that Benton did acquire an equity in the property
based upon the economic relation of Yellow Cab's value to the option price, and further noted that the evidence suggested an intent on
behalf of the parties to sell and not to rent. 02
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court. 0 3 In a complete shift
91.

Id. at 750.

92.

Id.

93. Id.
94.

Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

99.

Id. at 751.

100.
101.
opinion of
102.
103.

747-48.
748.
750.
750-51.

Id.
9 T.C.M. (CCH) 811 (1950). The Tax Court opinion is quoted extensively in the
the Fifth Circuit, 197 F.2d at 746-52.
197 F.2d at 751-52.
Id. at 754, rev'g. 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 811 (1950).
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of emphasis, the Fifth Circuit applied the following standard:
"Whether what is in form a lease is in effect a conditional sale contract depends on the intention of the parties. The economic relation
of the value of the property to the option price was only one factor to
be considered in .determining intent.' 10 4 The court emphasized that
the parties' conduct, including their recordkeeping and manner of
reporting the transaction on their tax returns, was consistent with a
lease, and that the parties did not consider the tax consequences of
the transaction at the time of contracting. 05
For some time after the Benton decision, the Tax Court straddled the fence between economic substance and subjective intent, 0 6
but landed firmly on the side of Benton in Northwest Acceptance
Corp. v. Commissioner.0 7 In Northwest Acceptance Corp., the Tax
Court, though not citing Benton by name, followed Benton's lead in
placing weight on the lessor's manner of reporting leases and sales
on its tax books.' 08 The Tax Court viewed the generous options
granted by the lessor as "intended to do no more than extend a privilege to customers of petitioner for their leasing business,"' e9 which
made it possible for the taxpayer not to "have to contend with disposal of the used machinery if the options were exercised."" 0
Both Benton and Northwest Acceptance Corp. established deferential tests for purchase options, apparently so that the results in
these cases would concur with their view of the parties' intent. The
court in Benton noted that the option price was not "unreasonably
low,""' and the Tax Court in Northwest Acceptance Corp. found
the purchase options compatible with true lease treatment so long as
the "ultimate purchase.

. .

by the lessee [was not] an absolute cer-

104. 197 F.2d at 752 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 753.
106. See, e.g., M. & W. Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 385 (1970), affid in part
and rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971); Lockhart Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 54
T.C. 301 (1970), arid, 446 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1971); Martin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731
(1965); Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 711 (1959), ar'd in part and rev'd in part, 379 F.2d
282 (1967); Beus v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1133 (1957), affd, 261 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1958);
Haggard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1124 (1958), affd per curiam, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.

1956); Oesterrich v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 277 (1953), rev'd, 226 F.2d 798 (9th
Cir. 1955).
107.

58 T.C. 836 (1972), aFd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974). For a brief

discussion of the case, see infra note 135.
108. 58 T.C. at 848-49.
109.
110.

Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
Id.

I11.

197 F.2d at 753.
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2

Since the Tax Court's decision in Northwest Acceptance

Corp., most courts have again straddled the fence between economic
substance and subjective intent. 113

Subjective intent should be irrelevant to the lease versus sale
issue. Tax law, like law in general, requires an intent criterion to
characterize an act or event only when after examining the act or
event itself, a choice of correct legal conclusion cannot be made, 14
or where an intent to engage in the act or event is a prerequisite to

the application of a specific legal conclusion. 1 5 In the overwhelming
majority of transactions, a lease can be distinguished from a sale by
cursory examination of the act or event (i.e., the contract), thereby
precluding the need for an intent criterion. Intent does not become
relevant simply because the task of distinguishing becomes more difficult. As long as a method of rational substantive distinction exists
to determine the appropriate label, intent should not enter the analy-

sis. Nontax law does not include subjective intent as an element of a
lease or a sale;" 06 there is no reason for tax law to be different. The
112. 58 T.C. at 848 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982); Sun Oil Co.
v. Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Universal
Drilling Co. v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. La. 1976); Transamerica Corp. v.
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 441 (1985); Davis v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441 (1978).
114. Examples in tax law include (1) the step transaction doctrine, see B. BITTKER & J.
EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.51 (4th ed.
1979) (integrating transaction's separate steps to determine tax consequences); (2) the accumulated earnings tax, see I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (West 1967 & Supp. 1985) (tax is imposed in
addition to § 11 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985) tax upon finding that corporation was "formed or
availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax," § 532(a) (1982)), and (3) the disallowance of deductions, credits, etc. resulting from acquisitions of corporations or corporate control, the principal purpose of which is to evade or avoid income tax, see I.R.C. § 269 (West
1978 & Supp. 1985) (intent used to distinguish malevolent from benevolent acquisitions).
115. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) (intent to join together
for business purpose or for joint economic gain requisite to creation of partnership).
116. In fact, contract law "objectively" views an intent to contract (i.e., through a reasonable man standard); subjective intent of the parties is practically irrelevant. See Hotchkiss
v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand, J.) afJ'd, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir.
1912). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (rev. ed. 1979). The subjective intent
test forces a court to examine evidence irrelevant to the existence of a lease qua lease or a sale
qua sale, unlike the gift area, where intent is one of the essential elements of a gift. See
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
The difference between a gift and a sale is easier to distinguish than the difference between a lease and a sale. Donative intent is required in order to give something without consideration, as a gift. On the other hand, leases and sales are easily distinguished only at their
polar extremes. The cases "in the middle" - which courts are invariably called upon to adjudicate - have distinctions which are subtle and often complex. Before reaching a conclusion
as to the parties' intent, clarification of the objective economic distinctions between a lease and
a sale is necessary to determine the nature of the transaction, irrespective of the parties' intent.
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courts' focus on subjective intent emphasizes form over substance in
determining the tax consequences of leasing transactions. 117 Courts

employing the subjective intent test that have recast a lease as a sale
have had to rely upon economic indicia. 118
The lack of uniformity in the case law may be partly attributed
to the Supreme Court's reluctance to set definitive guidelines in this
area,111or more likely due to the Court's uncertainty about how to

distinguish a lease from a sale. The following discussion will examine
the key provisions of a lease and explain how the economic substance
test reveals the true nature of the transaction.
Needless to say, the subjective intent courts have failed to take this intermediate step because
the objective definitions are precisely what these courts have diligently labored to avoid.
117. A clarification of the distinction between the subjective intent test and the elevation
of form over substance is necessary. The subjective intent test effectively elevates form over
substance because of the reliance on evidence that is easily manipulated by the parties. There
are other areas of tax law, however, where form is deliberately elevated over substance. The
inquiry is objective, like the economic substance test, but purposely mechanical and superficial.
Compare, e.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947) and Sullivan v. United
States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967), with Holsey v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958). See generally, Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43; B.
BITTKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 114, at 5 9.25.
Another example of the primacy of form in tax law, is I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) (1982) and
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-5 (1960) (classifying a corporation or partnership as "domestic" or
"foreign" by reference to the place of incorporation or formation).
118. See, e.g., Beus v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1958); Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956); Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir.
1955); Calbom v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1009 (1981); Johnson v. Commissioner,
21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1962).
119. Three Supreme Court cases have addressed the lease versus sale issue. See Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308
U.S. 252 (1939); Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496 (1936). The first
two cases, Frank Lyon Co. and Lazarus - primarily sale and leaseback cases - stand for the
proposition that tax consequences depend upon the substance, rather than the form, of the
transaction.
San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co. is a case of mainly historical interest. A lease of real
property straddled February 28, 1913, the effective date of the first Income Tax Act of 1913.
The lessee exercised a bargain purchase option at the expiration of the lease in 1916, and sold
portions of the property at a gain in subsequent years. Id. at 497. Since property appreciation
accruing prior to February 28, 1913 could not be taxed, the lessee argued that it acquired the
property at the inception of the lease. 297 U.S. at 497-98. If the argument were successful,
most of the gain due to pre-1913 appreciation would have escaped tax. The Court upheld the
Commissioner's position that the lessee acquired the property on the option exercise date. Id.
at 498. The Court incorrectly compared the lessees option with a bare option, in which the
underlying property is considered held as of the exercise date. Id. The use of the property
underlying the option changes the analysis because it raises the issue of how to characterize
the transaction that transfers property use, whereas no similar characterization issue arises
from the granting of a bare option.
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A.

Residual Value Risk

1. Purchase Options. - The allocation of residual value risk is
crucial under economic substance analysis. Many leases provide lessees with the option to buy the property for a fixed price during, or

at the end of, the lease term. This option, called a fixed price
purchase option, 120 shifts at least part of the risk of residual value
fluctuation' 2 ' away from the lessor. As long as the property's fair
market value remains above the option price, it should be presumed
that the lessee will exercise the option; therefore, the risk of fluctua-

tion in fair market value above the option price is borne solely by the
lessee. The only risk the lessor retains is that the asset's value on the

122
exercise date will fall below the option price.
Fixed price purchase options alter the allocation of residual
value risk, but do not affect the anticipated residual value of the
asset. The quantum of residual risk passing from the lessor to the
lessee 123 depends upon the spread between the option price and the
asset's expected residual value. The alteration of residual value risk
caused by a fixed price purchase option results in a risk split atypical
of the "garden variety" sale or lease. 124 In a routine sale, when an

owner closes out his investment, he relinquishes his interest in the
120.

Macan, Tax Aspects of Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED
377, 423-24 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980), places purchase options in four
categories:
1. options designed to offer "disaster" protection for the lessee, where the
price is the lesser of fair market value or a fixed amount substantially in excess of
anticipated residual value;
2. options at prices equal to the current best estimate of residual value;
3. options where the option price, although less than anticipated residual
value, is nevertheless sufficiently high (relative to anticipated residual value or to the
lessee's likely ability to exercise) that there is substantial unlikelihood that the option will in fact be exercised;
4. options at prices in the nominal range such that exercise of the option is
fairly assured.
Id.
121. Risk of residual value fluctuation refers to the risk that the actual value of the
leased property at the end of the lease term will be higher or lower than the value anticipated
by the parties when they entered into the lease.
122. See infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
123. If the actual value of the property on the exercise date falls below the option price,
it should be presumed that the lessee will not exercise the option. Thus, the lessor will lose his
hoped-for income from the lessee, and will invariably dispose of the property for less than the
option price. Alternatively, if the actual asset value exceeds the option price, the lessee's exercise of the option should be presumed. The lessor's income from the option should be assured
so long as the actual value exceeds the option price.
124. See supra note 121.
LEASING
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property's residual value. Conversely, in a lease arrangement, a lessor only temporarily parts with his possessory interest in the asset for
the lease term, but expects to regain possession of a valuable asset at
the end of the lease term. Thus, a typical seller parts with all of the
residual value risk, whereas a typical lessor parts with none of it.
These transactions, while distinguishing a lease from a sale, represent the polar ends of the spectrum. The problem facing the
courts is the difficulty of distinguishing the transactions falling in the
middle. Two types of residual value analysis are useful for discerning
the dividing line between lease and sale transactions. "Purchase option analysis" compares expected residual value with the purchase
option price, measuring the allocation of residual value risk between
the parties to the lease. 12 5 "Residual value analysis" compares expected residual value with the original asset cost and determines
from the existence of a valuable residual whether the lessor retains a
26
substantial economic interest in the leased asset.
a. Nominal Purchase Options. - The courts find nominal
purchase options 27 easy to analyze 28 because these options transfer
the entire risk of the residual value fluctuation to the lessee. The
lessee's exercise of a nominal purchase option is virtually assured due
to the substantial bargain available to the lessee for a minimal additional investment. The lessor, on the other hand, closes out his investment in the asset in exchange for the lease payments and 129
option
price. Courts consistently recast such a transaction as a sale.
b. Fair Value Options. - The tax analysis of fair market value
125.

See infra notes 127-83 and accompanying text.

126. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
127. To measure nominality, the option price should be compared with the expected fair
market value on the exercise date. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH)
1126, 1131 (1962). There is no absolute ceiling, but practitioners and courts use 10 percent of

original cost as a rule of thumb. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39, 50 (1974);
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836, 846 (1972) affd per curiam, 500
F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Home News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M.
834 (1969) (purchase option for 10% of original cost; held, conditional sale). Arguably, new
I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(A)(i) (Supp. 1 1983) codifies the 10% cutoff.

128. See, e.g., Quartzite Stone v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 511 (1958), affid, 273 F.2d
738 (10th Cir. 1959) (lessee offered a $1 purchase option on a tractor). The Tax Court found
it "obvious" and "unnecessary to discuss" the lessee-acquired equity, and held that the rentals
were actually nondeductible payments for the purchase of the equipment. Id. at 518-19.
129. See, e.g., Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955) ($10
purchase option); Johnson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1962) ($1 purchase op-

tion); Quartzite Stone v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 511 (1958), affid 273 F.2d 738 (10th Cir.
1959) ($1 purchase option); Van Valkenburgh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 753

(1967) ($1 purchase option).
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purchase options receives little attention in the case law. It is, none-

theless, clear that the presence of a fair market value purchase option does not violate the equity prohibition of section 162(a)(3). 130
Residual value risk remains entirely in the lessor's hands. Although
the lessor relinquishes his right to reclaim possession of the property
on the exercise date, the lessee acquires nothing of value from the
option.' 3 '
c. Fixed Price Purchase Options Above a Nominal Price.Courts, commentators1 3 2 and the IRS 33 sharply disagree on the

proper treatment of fixed price purchase options above a nominal
price. Courts employing the economic substance test generally hold
that the inclusion of a fixed price purchase option gives the lessee an

equity in the property and transforms a lease into a conditional

sale.3 4 Courts using the subjective intent test, however, add other
130. See Estate of Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 434-35 (1985); Sun Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978) (fair market
value purchase option did not give lessees an equity); Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(3), 1975-1 C.B.
715, 716 (the Service will not issue advance rulings on leverage lease transactions with fixed
priced purchase options).
131. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text. The only benefit which the lessee
ensures for himself is a supply of the leased asset at the end of the lease term. Unless the asset
is scarce, little or no value should attach to this benefit.
132. See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 10, at 11 (suggesting adoption of the accounting
profession's test, which looks to whether exercise by the lessee of the purchase option was
"'reasonably assured from the beginning' "); Faber, Determining the Owner of an Asset for
Tax Purposes, 61 TAxEs 795, 810 (1983) (claiming that the theoretically proper analysis of
fixed price purchase options requires the annual allocation of depreciation deductions to the
lessor if it appears that the option price will be higher than the property's expected value, and
to the lessee if it appears that the option price will be lower than the expected value, the
determination being made at the end of each year during the lease; admitting, however, that
the approach adopted by the courts is sensible, although imperfect).
133. See Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(3), 1975-1 C.B. 715 (lessee may not have an option to
purchase the property "at a price less than its fair market value at the time the right is exercised"); Rev. Rul. 55-540, § 4(e), 1955-2 C.B. 39 (purchase option may be indicative of a
conditional sale if the purchase option price "is nominal in relation to the value of the property
. . . or which is a relatively small amount when compared with the total payments which are
required to be made").
134. See, e.g., Home News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 834
(1969); Quartzite Stone v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 511 (1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 738 (10th Cir.
1959); Bowen v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 446 (1949); Mills v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 25
(1948). These cases stress the equivalence of the sum of rentals and purchase option price to
the property's value.
In Bowen v. Commissioner, for example, the sum of lease rentals and the option price
equalled the value of the leased equipment plus a one percent per month value increment. Id.
at 449-50. The court concluded that the "relation of the so-called rental payments to value
. . . represented such a substantial portion of value that they constituted more than a mere
payment for hire," id. at 463, and that the lessee therefore had acquired an "equity", prohibiting the taxpayer-lessor from reporting the rentals as ordinary income. 12 T.C. at 466.
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considerations to their analysis. 135 For example, some courts look to

whether the purchase option prices were reasonable in relation to the
expected fair market value on the exercise date.136 If so, the lease is
upheld for tax purposes; 3 7 if not, the transaction is recast as a
sale.'38
Courts are split along similar lines on the closely related issue of
dual-character lease payments. Leases containing this feature provide that all or part of the aggregate lease payments will be credited
toward the option price upon exercise of the option.' 3 9 Courts utilizing the economic substance test treat the dual-character lease differently than a normal fixed price purchase option and deny lease sta135. Courts utilizing different measures of "intent" in their analysis may reach different
results where rent + option = asset value + interest. For example, in Haggard v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1124 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1958), the court
recharacterized the transaction as a sale where the lessee paid $24,000 in term rentals over
two years, id. at 1129, and $24,000 pursuant to a fixed purchase option, id., for property worth
approximately $48,000. Id. at 1130. On the other hand, in Northwest Acceptance Corp. v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), affid per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974), the Tax
Court upheld true lease treatment for a portfolio of leases. The term rentals over a 14 to 61
month period, Id. at 839, plus the option price, approximated the amount a buyer would pay
under a deferred payment plan, id. at 849; the leases also contained fixed purchase options
ranging from 10 to 35% of the original cost of the equipment. Id. at 840.
136. See cases cited infra notes 137-38.
137. See, e.g., Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979), aff'd, 661 F.2d 76
(6th Cir. 1981); LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974); Northwest Acceptance Corp.
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974).
138. See, e.g., M. & W. Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 385, 395 (1970), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1971) (affirmed on this issue); Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
United States, 209 F.Supp. 886, 891 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
139. The following example illustrates a dual-character lease: A five year lease contains a purchase option for $100,000, representing a reasonable approximation of fair market
value anticipated in Year 3, and is exerciseable after the second year of the lease. Under the
terms of the lease, the option price may be reduced dollar for dollar by the yearly rentals of
$10,000. If the lessee chooses to exercise the option in Year 3, a payment of $70,000 will be
due, In Years 4 and 5, the option price will be reduced to $60,000 and $50,000, respectively. If
the option is exercised, the lease payments serve as installments on the purchase price. If the
option is never exercised, the lessee has merely paid $50,000 in rent.
Arguably, the $10,000 annual reductions in the option price in Years 4 and 5 represent a
decline in the asset's fair market value, and, therefore, the rent paid in Years 4 and 5 (if the
option is not exercised in Year 3) does not build any equity in the lessee. Nevertheless, rent
paid in Years 1, 2 and 3 gives the lessee an equity in the property in violation of § 162(a)(3)
(1982). Moreover, so long as the residual value exceeds the $50,000 option price in Year 5 a very likely occurrence on these facts - the lessee's choice to postpone taking advantage of
the $30,000 bargain through exercise of the option in Year 3 will be influenced by the opportunity to take advantage of the deferral benefits in spreading out the $70,000 purchase price over
two years. The lessee can thereby increase his original $30,000 advantage by reducing the
present value of the $70,000 purchase price.
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tus. 40 Courts using the subjective intent approach, on the other
hand, focus on the "primary purpose" of the lease payments. 41
These courts reason that if the primary purpose of the payments is to

build toward the exercise of the option, then conditional sale treatment prevails. These courts further compare the option duration with

the lease term length14 2 and look to other factors such as the size of
43

the option price and, unsurprisingly, the parties subjective intent.1
d. Looking for Symmetry: A Workable Definition of "Equity".

Tax law employs two different standards when analyzing a lease.
If the lessee is the focus of the inquiry, the test is whether the lessee

has acquired an "equity" in the leased property.

44 If the

lessor is the

focus of inquiry, the relevant question is whether the lessor has re-

tained the economic burdens and benefits of ownership. The question
unanswered by the courts is whether the lessee "equity" test and the
lessor "economic burden and benefit" test are inherently

asymmetrical. 145
The meaning of the term "equity" in the context of section

162(a)(3) has yet to be adequately defined by the courts.
defined "equity" as a "right of redemption, a reversionary
right to specific performance, or in general any right
property which traditionally would have been enforceable

One court
interest, a
respecting
by means

140. See, e.g., Home News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 834
(1969); Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1336 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d
319 (7th Cir. 1956). In fact, courts denying lease status argue that the lease payments themselves build up "equity" the lessee's because of the simultaneous reduction in the purchase
option price. Therefore, dual-character leases are an easier case for sale recharacterization,
even if the purchase option price equals anticipated residual value.
141. Kitchin v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1738 (1963), rev'd, 340 F.2d 895 (4th
Cir. 1965); Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 711 (1959); Harrah v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.
1236 (1958); Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir.
1949).
142. In Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th
Cir. 1949), the Tax Court noted that the duration of the option was three years while the lease
term length was 10 years, id. at 455, thereby supporting the view that the lessee's acquisition
purpose was secondary to the primary purpose of paying rent. Id.
143. See, e.g., Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319, 322-23 (7th
Cir. 1956); Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 711, 720 (1959); Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner,
10 T.C. 445, 456 (1948), affid, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949). "Subjective intent" and "primary purpose" are very similar inquiries. The "primary purpose" test differs to the extent that
it concedes the existence of both intent to lease and intent to purchase, and measures the
stronger of the two. The "subjective intent test" theorizes a singular bent of mind on the part
of both parties.

144. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1982).
145.

See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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of an equitable remedy.' 1 46 This definition, while premised on the
traditional property law notion of equity, is both overinclusive and
underinclusive. It is overinclusive because a lessee is entitled to enforce a fair market value purchase option on real property by obtaining a decree of specific performance; 147 it is underinclusive because a nominal purchase option for personal property is usually not
148
enforceable in equity.
The following definition of "equity" for use in section 162(a)(3)
cases may be more helpful: "[A] lessee possesses an equity when he

acquires a potentially valuable right in connection with the ownership of the property". 49 A fixed price purchase option under this
definition would produce an "equity" if the lessee's right had an ascertainable dollar value. This test applied to the above examples
would yield the correct results. The lessee holding the fair market
value purchase option does not have a valuable right because an interested buyer can purchase the property in the market for the same
price. The holder of the nominal purchase option, however, does possess a valuable ownership right. The option right is worth at least the

difference between the expected fair market value and the exercise
price.1 50
146. Oakes v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 524, 531 (1965).
147. See generally 3 G.W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1154 (repl. ed.
1980).
148. An equitable decree of specific performance is unavailable, unless the personal
property is unique. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 comment c (rev. ed.
1981); Fortner v. Wilson, 202 Okla. 563, 216 P.2d 299 (1950) (denying specific relief to purchaser of automobile on the ground that personal property was not unique and damages were
adequate to compensate plaintiff). See also F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, A COURSE OF LECTURES
303 (2d ed. rev. 1936).
149. In Lester v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 711, 721 (1959), the Tax Court stated that:
where the 'lessee,' as a result of the 'rental' payment, acquires something of value in
relation to the overall transaction other than the mere use of the property, he is
building up an equity in the property and the payments do not therefore come
within the definition of rent contained in section 23 (a)(1)(A) [current version in §
162(a)(3)].
Id. Although this statement comports with the test for "equity" suggested in this Article, the
Tax Court in Lester tried to integrate the "equity test" with Benton's subjective intent test.
See Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952). The Lester court ultimately based
its decision on the parties' intent.
150. Suppose the lessee on a five year computer lease was entitled under the terms of the
lease to purchase the computer for $10 at the end of the lease term. In Year 5, when the fair
market value of the computer is $1,000, the lessee offers to assign his option to purchase to
Mr. X, a third party in the market for a used computer, for $900. Mr. X will gladly pay the
$900; the $910 combined cost of the option assignment and exercise price is $90 below the
prevailing price tag in the market. In fact, Mr. X should be willing to pay $990 for the lessee's
rights under the purchase option.
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e.

A Uniform TransactionalStandard. -

The tax provisions

governing lessors are less specific than those with reference to lessees
and, therefore, under current law, the standards are not symmetrical. 151 There is no evidence, however, that Congress intended to

make them asymmetrical, thereby further complicating the tax
treatment of leases. It would be neither logical nor administratively
desirable to create an asymmetrical system. While the test should
govern both sides of the lease transaction, current law has failed to

converge the tests. The following analysis explores the theoretical
asymmetry of applying a weighing test to the lessor and the "equity"
test to the lessee.

The lessor effectively relinquishes his residual interest in the
property, and tax status as owner, if the property's expected fair

market value on the exercise date exceeds the option price. 5 2 Between the two parties, the lessee should be deemed the owner. The

lessee has possession and use of the property for the lease term, and
more likely than not, will exercise the option, acquiring full title and
control on the exercise date. Conversely, the lessor does not have use

of the property for the lease term, and is less likely to reacquire the
property. This transaction more closely resembles a conditional sale;
The third party is really unnecessary for a precise definition of "equity," but is, rather,
merely illustrative. The analysis does not change if the option is non-transferable. The focus on
"equity" in § 162(a)(3) (1982) is on the lessee himself. The forbidden "equity," therefore, also
arises whenever the lessee would be willing to offer valuable consideration to a third party or
the lessor to acquire the rights he possesses under the purchase option. The willingness to offer
valuable consideration will exist with any fixed price purchase option. See infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
151. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982) does not contain a symmetrical mandate that the lessor not
part with any "equity" to retain the right to deduct depreciation.
152. From a risk allocation perspective, the lessor retains a relatively insubstantial risk
that the leased asset will decline in value below the exercise price. A standard demanding
anything more than a slight differential between fair market value and option price would
place substantial weight on the form of the transaction in violation of the Supreme Court's
directive to elevate substance over form. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561,
573 (1978); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939). See also Martin
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 731, 740 (1965). Because the likelihood of exercise or non-exercise
is roughly equal in the small differential cases, the transaction is somewhere between a lease
and sale, but forced into one or the other by the need to choose between the two contending
characterizations. Tax analysis, in disregarding form, should be sensitive to the slightest tipping of the risk allocation scales. Thus, an "economic compulsion test," see, e.g., Northwest
Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836, 850 (1972), aft'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222
(9th Cir. 1974) (examining whether lessor imposes certain ownership risks on the lessee in
order to minimize lessor's business risks), tends to tip the scales in favor of lease characterization, thereby deviating from the substance over form principle.
Where a fixed price put option is set above the anticipated residual value, the same analysis applies but the risk allocation is reversed.
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transfer of title is delayed until the purchaser pays the entire sale
price. The lessor should not retain ownership status merely because
the lessee has not fully assumed the incidents of ownership. The lessor's retention of a residue of risk153 should not overshadow the
lessee's more substantial relationship to the property. The transac-

tion, in substance, is more like a sale than a lease. The situation is
comparable to a sale on credit, where the buyer's tax position, as
owner of the purchased goods, is unaffected by the fact that the

seller bears some risk of the buyer's nonperformance.
When the option price accurately reflects anticipated residual
value, the parties are in a state of equipoise. The lessee possesses all
of the upside risk of residual value fluctuation, and the lessor possesses an equal amount of downside risk.15 4 Both sides appear
153. The lessor retains the risk that the property's value will decline below the option
price. On the other hand, the lessee bears the risk that the property's value will decline to a
value between the anticipated residual value and the option price, and enjoys the benefit of
residual value appreciation.
154. The anticipated residual value referred to in the text is the median of the statistical
distribution of expected values, rather than the mean. An example will illustrate the distinction. Suppose the anticipated residual value of an asset is subject to the following distribution
of expected values:

(1)

(2)

Expected
Residual
Value

Midpoint
Value

<80
80-90
90-100
100-I 10
110-120
120-130
130-140
140-150
>150

85
95
105
115
125
135
145

(3)

Probability
0
20%
30%
25%
10%
5%
5%
5%
0

Product
of (2)
and (3)

17
28.5
26.25
11.5
6.25
6.75
7.25

103.50 (Mean)
The mean anticipated residual value of $103.50 is calculated by assuming that the expected
values are evenly distributed within every $10 band; thus, the midpoint value multiplied by the
probability of its occurrence determines the weighted value of that band. However, the median
expected residual value, according to the probability distribution, is $100 because at that point
the probability that the residual value will be lower than $100 is equal to the probability that
the residual value will be higher than $100. It would therefore be inaccurate to assert that, at
$100, the lessee's potential upside benefit is equal to the lessor's potential downside risk; in
fact, the lessee's potential benefit is slightly greater than the lessor's potential loss because the
range of expected residual values is skewed upward, i.e., the lessee is likely to gain more than
the lessor is likely to lose. Nevertheless, the $100 option price is the point of equipoise because
at that point the likelihood of exercise and nonexercise of the option are equal. Thus, the
equivalence of the risk of residual value fluctuation refers to the allocation of probabilities, not
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equally important to ownership status because the true owner typi-

cally benefits from increases and suffers from declines in asset
value. 155 This state of equipoise, however, should shift in favor of the
lessee when the lessee's present possession and use of the property
are taken into account.1 "' As a result, the lessee should assume ownweighted values.
155. The Treasury Regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 83 (West 1984 & Supp.
1985) lend support by analogy to this proposition, by considering either risk of loss, see Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(6) (1978), or benefit of appreciation, see Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1978)
(2d paragraph), as relevant in determining whether the deferral privileges of § 83 apply.
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(4), example (1), provides that stock rights are subject to a substantial
risk of forfeiture where an employee is obliged to perform substantial services and is unable to
earn a profit on stock resold to the employer. I.R.C. § 83 allows a recipient of property transferred in connection with the performance of services to postpone recognition of income until
the rights in the property are either transferable or no longer subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. See I.R.C. § 8 3(a) (1982).
To determine whether a transfer of property has occurred, however, risk of loss figures
prominently. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(6) (1978) states that "the extent to which the transferee
does not incur the risk of a beneficial owner that the value of the property at the time of
transfer will decline substantially" indicates "that no transfer has occurred." The Regulations
clearly indicate here that the substance of the transaction is determinative. See Treas. Reg. §
1.83-3(a)(2) (1978).
The § 83 regulations provide that a transferee who lacks risk of loss is not the true owner,
whereas a lessee who lacks risk of loss under a fixed price purchase option is arguably the true
owner. These conclusions are nevertheless consistent. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(7), example (5)
(1978) refers to a case where an employee-transferee of company stock is bound to sell to his
employer-transferor without any risk of loss by the transferee upon his termination of employment. In the case of a fixed price purchase option, the transferor is bound to sell to the transferee without risk of loss to the transferee. In the latter case, the transferee is likely to retain
permanent dominion over the property; in the Regulation example, presumably the employee
will eventually leave the employer and sell back the stock. The § 83 analogy is also useful in
analyzing lessor put options, where the lessor has the right to sell the leased property at a fixed
price at the end of the lease term. The denial of ownership status to the lessor is consistent
with the § 83 regulations because the use of a fixed-price put option eliminates the lessor's risk
of depreciable loss. See Simonson, supra note 10, at 14.
156. But cf. Macan, supra note 120, at 424-25. Macan seems only to admit that the
attenuation of the lessor's relationship to the property is significant in a leveraged lease; he also
seemingly argues that the lessor's downside risk supports the lessor's retention of tax status as
property owner. Id.
An alternative view of the risk-split issue supports the conclusion that the lessee is the
true owner. Lessees prefer inclusion of fixed price purchase options because they do not wish to
pay twice for the same property upon their eventual acquisition. A lessee exercising a fair
market value purchase option could conceivably pay a price approximating the original cost of
the property if the property were to appreciate in value. In reality, the lessee will never pay
twice for the property. The rentals are for the use of the property and the right to income
therefrom, whereas, the price to be paid upon subsequent purchase represents the discounted
value of future income streams from use of the property. See generally M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 27, at 6.07; Kahn, supra note 48.
Notwithstanding economic theory, the risk of subsequent price increases is real. A purchaser does not bear this risk, having already acquired ownership of the property. A lessee not
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ership status for tax purposes; therefore, the lessee should lose the
rental deduction, and the lessor, the depreciation deduction.15 7 This
symmetry, however, may not always exist. For example, where the
option price exceeds the anticipated residual value, the lessee still
acquires an equity because someone may be willing to purchase the
option based on the possibility that the residual value will rise higher
than initially expected.1 58 The lessor's risk, however, is still more
substantial than the lessee's because the property will more likely
revert to the lessor at the end of the lease term. The lessor should
arguably retain the ownership status and continue taking depreciation deductions despite the lessee's inability to deduct his rental
holding a fixed price purchase option, however, does bear this risk. The fixed price purchase
option shields the lessee from the risk that the property's value will rise above the option price.
This places the lessee in the same risk position vis-a-vis subsequent price increases as the
purchaser. The price of the option merely reflects the quantum of risk protection; if the option
price is equal to anticipated residual value, the lessee has completely shielded himself against
the 50% chance that the actual residual value will exceed anticipated value.
157. But see Simonson, supra note 10, at 20, 31. Simonson argues that, in lease treatment, the format chosen by the parties should prevail where the lessor retains either the appreciation potential or the downside risk of economic loss in the residual value of the leased asset,
Id. at 20, based on the conclusion that "the tie goes to the runner." Id. at 31. After factoring
in the lessee's present use of the property, however, the tie is broken in favor of sale treatment,
at least in cases where the lessee's entitled use of the property is more substantial than that of
the lessor. Use of property, of course, is not a relevant factor in most cases; otherwise, lessors
could rarely, if ever, qualify for tax ownership. Rather, in an even risk-split situation such as
this one, factoring property use into the analysis helps to identify, among close, competing
candidates, the party with the more intimate relationship with the property.
158. The price of a call option generally has two elements: The spread value, (i.e., the
difference between the fair market value and the exercise price) and the time value, also
known as the premium for the option privilege. See generally A. BOOKBINDER, SECURITY OPTIONS STRATEGY 61-66 (1975); L. MCMILLEN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 9-15

(1980).
In equipment and real estate leasing, the time value of the option is likely to be substantial because of the distant exercise dates many options on leased equipment possess. Traditional § 162(a)(3) "equity" analysis has focused solely on the size of the spread between expected fair market value and exercise price, on the theory that a large spread reasonably
assures an exercise of the option.
There are two major problems with this line of analysis. First, nothing in the language or
legislative history of § 162(a)(3) suggests that "reasonable assurance" is, or should be, the
touchstone for denial of the rental deduction. Second, if a "reasonable assurance" test is used,
the value of the option privilege is evidence that exercise of the option is reasonably assured.
The value indicates the probability that the value of the underlying asset will surpass the
exercise price on the exercise date. In short, the spread value reflects the current state of the
market, and the option privilege premium forecasts the odds of further upward movement in
the price of the underlying asset. Under a "value" test for the presence of a lease "equity", see
supra note 150 and accompanying text, the importance of the option privilege premium is
clear. Even if an option reflects anticipated fair market value, the other factors that influence
the value of the option, when considered, may reveal that the lessee indeed possesses an "equity" in the asset.
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payments. 59
This remnant of asymmetry creates complex administrative difficulties. While the courts do engage in current valuation determina-

tions when concrete evidence is available, 60 they are ill-equipped,
especially in an adversarial setting, to identify expected fair market
value with the needed precision.
The various problems resulting from the tax law view of the
lessor and lessee can best be redressed by moving away from the
deduction-oriented approach of sections 162(a)(3) and 167(a) and
by adopting a transactional' 6 ' statutory or regulatory scheme. An

effective rule would include a provision denying lease status to leases
containing a fixed price purchase option. This would effectively elim-

inate decisional error and the administrative and judicial burdens
imposed by a fact-sensitive rule.
Congress' Joint Committee on Taxation studied the same topic

and concluded:
The fair market value purchase option requirement fulfills
three purposes related to the determination of the economic substance of the transaction. First, it ensures that the lessor bear the
risk implicit in ownership that no market will exist at the end of
the lease. The owner of depreciable property is the person who
159. This anomaly results from the Code's use of different standards when testing the
allowability of the rental and depreciation deductions. Although the "equity" test of §
162(a)(3) contains no cross-reference to the ownership test implicit in § 167 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1985), many lessee rental-deduction cases have relied upon lessor depreciation-deduction
cases and vice versa. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974) (lessee case;
followed Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 836 (1972), aff'd per curiam,
500 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1974), a lessor case); Kitchin v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH)
1738 (1963), rev'd, 340 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965) (lessor case; followed Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949), a lessee case).
This lack of symmetry has precedent in tax law. For example, compare the treatment of
the seller's amount realized upon a sale of property encumbered by nonrecourse debt in excess
of fair market value and property basis, with treatment of the buyer's inclusion of such nonrecourse debt in basis. Compare e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), and Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983), with Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d
1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Rev. Rul. 81-278, 1981-2 C.B. 159; Rev. Rul. 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182;
and Rev. Rul. 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58 (liability created by the nonrecourse note given by the
buyer to the seller may not be included in the basis of film rights). See generally Andrews, On
Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983) (discussing historical and current treatment of nonrecourse debt).
160. For example, I.R.C. § 1001(b) (1982) requires a determination of "the fair market
value of the property . . . received." Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (1957) states that fair market
value is a "question of fact." However, the § 1001(b) valuation determination is after the fact,
the property already having been "received."
161. For a discussion of the "transactional" approach, see supra note 22.
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bears any decline in value of the asset. Second, it ensures that the
lessor has retained an equity interest in the property. Any fixed
price option represents a limitation on the lessor's right of full enjoyment of the property's value. Third, it limits the ability of the
parties to establish an artificial rent structure to avoid the cash flow
test.162

The Joint Committee supports the view that fixed price
purchase options are inconsistent with a true lease. If, in future legislation, Congress permits fixed price purchase options based on a
reasonable approximation of residual value, it should do so only to
encourage leasing activity.
2. Residual Value Guarantee Classes. - Courts1 63 are in gen162.

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 97TH CONG, 2D

Sass., supra note 15, at 8.

163. Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'g 76 T.C. 547
(1981); Leslie Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 411 (1983) (consumer-use vehicle openended leases held to be conditional sales contracts). But cf.M & M Leasing Corp. v. SeattleFirst Nat'l Bank, 391 F.Supp. 1290 (W.D. Wash. 1975), affid in part and rev'd in part, 563
F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978) (holding open-end leases with
residual guarantee clauses were true leases under banking law).
In Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, a car dealer sold and leased motor vehicles to its customers. The leases contained a residual guarantee clause, which required the lessee to pay the
excess of the estimated "depreciated value" of the vehicle over its actual wholesale value. If
the vehicle's wholesale value exceeded the "depreciated value", the lease required that the
lessee "'receive any gain which resulted from final disposition of the vehicle.'" 692 F.2d at
652.
The Commissioner argued that each lease constituted a conditional sale, and disallowed
Swift Dodge's investment tax credit. 76 T.C. at 562-63. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's position, noting that fixing "depreciated value" at wholesale value reduced the lessee's
risk of loss. 76 T.C. at 569. The lessee could pay the specified wholesale value, keep the car
and sell it to a third party at retail, to "offset any potential loss attributable to fluctuations in
the vehicle's residual value." 76 T.C. at 569.
In its reversal of the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit employed a novel four-pronged examination concerning the allocation of duties, legal rights, risks and intentions of the parties. The
approach is interesting, but it was ill-executed. For example, the court remarked, in analyzing
the parties' legal rights, that:
Swift Dodge retained the legal title to the vehicle and the right to assign the user's
payments from the agreement to third parties. Swift Dodge would retain these
rights under a conditional sales contract. . . .Upon premature termination of the
agreement, Swift Dodge also had the right to take possession of the vehicle and
resell it. This is essentially the same right Swift Dodge would have under a typical
conditional sales contract.
692 F.2d at 653 (citations omitted).
The problem with the court's analysis is that the facts support Swift Dodge's claim to
lessor status. None of the rights retained by Swift Dodge are inconsistent with its ownership of
the vehicle. The fact that a conditional sales contract allows the seller to retain such ownership
rights adds no force to the court's argument. The only support the court finds for its holding,
upon which the correctness of the court's conclusion rests, is the allocation of residual value
risk. See id. at 654.
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eral agreement with the Service"" that a lease containing a residual

guarantee clause 165 - even without a purchase option - is, in substance, a conditional sale since the lessee assumes the residual value
risk. A residual value guarantee clause, most often found in motor
vehicle leases, is normally comprised of two elements. The first element is a guaranteed residual value for the leased asset.16 6 If, at the
expiration of the lease, the actual fair market value is less than the
guaranteed value, the lessee must pay the difference to the lessor.
The Ninth Circuit found that the lessee assumed the risk of depreciable loss, id., an argument that supports the Commissioner's position. The Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit refer to
this risk (i.e., risk shifted by the residual guarantee clause) as "risk of depreciable loss," rather
than residual value risk. A distinction should be made between a lessor's attempt to ensure
that the returned leased asset will be substantially as valuable as when initially leased, and the
lessor's attempt to vest the lessee with the benefit or burden of future appreciation or decline in
the residual value of the asset. In the former situation, referred to herein as the risk of depreciable loss, see infra notes 219-72 and accompanying text, the lessor protects himself against
anticipatedand unanticipateddeclines in asset value. In the latter, the lessor is protected by a
residual guarantee clause, but only against an unanticipated decline in asset value; the lessor
will suffer the burden of anticipateddepreciable loss.
164. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8240018, No. 293 (CCH) (Oct. 13, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as LTR 8240018]. The taxpayer in LTR 8240018 was a commercial bank engaged in
personal and business automobile leasing. The Service denied a favorable ruling request, treating the open-end leases as sales for tax purposes on the following rationale:
Basically, most, if not all, of the risks of decrease in value of the vehicles are
the responsibility of the customer, not taxpayer. Upon the scheduled termination of
the agreements, the customer is liable to taxpayer to pay. . . any amount by which
the unpaid lease balance or estimated wholesale value exceeds the actualwholesale
value. In addition, the customer is liable for damage to the vehicle that is attributable to improper customer maintenance. Finally, the customer under "personal use"
agreements must pay a certain amount to the taxpayer if the customer's mileage
exceeds the estimated mileage figure in the agreement and the actual wholesale
value is less than the estimated wholesale value.
In the event of an early termination, the customer is responsible for . . . the
difference between actual wholesale value and the unpaid lease balance.
In contrast to the above responsibilities and obligations of the customer, taxpayer's only risk or obligation under the agreement is the risk of customer's default.
However, such a risk is the same type of risk that a secured lender would be subject
to in a conditional sales contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
The facts of LTR 8240018 are very similar to those of Swift Dodge and the reasoning is
consistent with that of the Ninth Circuit in that case.
165. A residual value guarantee clause is also known as a terminal rental adjustment
clause, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(f)(8)-12, 47 Fed. Reg. 52730 (1982) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Nov. 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.168(f(8)-12] and is the premier feature of an open-end lease, see M & M Leasing Corp. v.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 391 F.Supp. 1290, 1293 (W.D. Wash. 1975), afl'd in part and rev'd
in part, 563 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). The term "residual
value guarantee clause" is more descriptive than other phrases. For the sake of consistency,
this term will be used throughout this discussion.
166. See, e.g., M & M Leasing Corp., 391 F. Supp. at 1293.
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Likewise, if the actual fair market value at the expiration of the
lease exceeds the guaranteed value, the lessor must pay the difference to the lessee. The second element consists of an informal
purchase option exerciseable on the lease expiration date for the stipulated anticipated value;167 such an exercise cancels the lessee's obligation to refund any loss of residual value.
While a lease that contains both elements of a residual value
guarantee clause should be treated as a sale - based on the inclusion of a fixed price purchase option - the proper tax treatment of a
lease containing only the first element requires a different, and more
precise analysis. A fixed, guaranteed value for the asset at the end of
the lease term protects the lessor against the risk of a large, unanticipated decline in residual value in exchange for the lessor's relinquishment of his residual value appreciation above the asset's expected value. Since the lessor repossesses the asset after the lease,
however, he may still benefit from post-repossession appreciation. In
sum, the lessor shifts two important attributes of ownership to the
lessee: (1) the risk of residual value decline below the stipulated
price; and (2) the potential for residual value appreciation above the
stipulated price.
It is difficult to force the "one element" transaction - a guaranteed residual value arrangement - into either a lease or sale pigeonhole. Although the risk/benefit allocation is similar, a "one element" residual guarantee clause does not transfer the right to
possession at lease end. The lessee's enjoyment of the appreciation in
residual value is frozen in time, whereas a purchase option holder
may enjoy further appreciation after the exercise date. On the other
hand, a residual value guarantee clause, unlike a fixed price
purchase option, transfers the risk of residual value decline below
stipulated value to the lessee.
In Proposed Regulation section 1.168(f)(8)-12, the Treasury
concurred that a residual value clause in a motor vehicle lease will
cause the transaction to be characterized as a conditional sale contract.168 The Treasury makes no distinction between a sale to a third
167. Id. at 1294. The enforceability of such an option is unclear.
168. The proposed regulation was issued shortly after passage of § 210 of TEFRA. Section 210 is not incorporated into the Code but is an appended note to I.R.C. § 168. It states, in
pertinent part:
(a) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any qualified motor vehicle agreement, the fact
that such agreement contains a terminal rental adjustment clause shall not be taken
into account in determining whether such agreement is a lease.
(b) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
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party, 8 9 and affixing of fair market value through bidding without a
(1)QUALIED MOTOR VEHICLE AGREEMENT.-The term "qualified motor vehicle agreement" means any agreement with respect to a motor vehicle (including a trailer)(A) which was entered into before(i)the enactment of any law, or
(ii) the publication by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate of any regulation, which provides that any agreement with a
terminal rental adjustment clause is not a lease...
(C) with respect to which the lessee under the agreement uses the
property subject to the agreement in a trade or business or for the
production of income.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 210, 96 Stat. 324,
447-48 (codified at I.R.C. § 168 note (1982)), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, §§ 32(b), 712(d), U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 494, 531, 947 (current version at I.R.C. § 168 note (West Supp. 1985)). The Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 32(b)
amended TEFRA by inserting the following language after "agreement" the first place it appears: "entered into on or before the 90th day after the date of the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984." Section 210 was enacted to protect parties engaged in motor vehicle
leasing against the retroactive denial of lease treatment after the Service reversed its longstanding audit position tolerating such clauses. See I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8019120, No. 168
(CCH) (May 21, 1980). The Treasury promptly responded with Prop. Treas. Reg.
§1.168(f)(8)-12, supra note 165, denying lease treatment to motor vehicle leases containing
residual guarantee clauses.
The commercial property limitation in TEFRA, § 210(b)(1)(C), produced anomalous results in Leslie Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 411 (1983). The Tax Court in Leslie
Leasing Co. applied § 210 to a taxpayer engaged in motor vehicle leasing. Id. Eighty-five
percent of its leases were commercial and 15% were consumer. Id. at 413. The Tax Court held
that the commercial leases were true leases and the consumer, or non-business, leases were
conditional sales contracts. Id. at 419. Risk allocation was identical in each lease, but the Tax
Court could circumvent neither the express application of § 210 to commercial leases nor the
authority of Swift Dodge beyond the confines of § 210.
169. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(f)(8)-12, supra note 165, which states:
Example (I) A purchases automobiles, financing the purchases with amounts
borrowed from C. A provides automobiles to customers who will use the automobiles in their trades or businesses. A enters into the following agreement with all of
its customers. The agreement, which is labeled a lease, provides that the customer
may use the automobiles for a specified period of time in exchange for a specified
monthly payment. The parties have not elected to treat these agreements as leases
under section 168(0(8). Under the agreement, the customer is responsible for all
operating expenses, including maintenance and repair on the automobile, and is required to carry insurance indemnifying A against damage to or loss of the vehicle.
The customer is also responsible for sales, use, excise and personal property taxes
levied against the automobile. The agreement provides that at the end of the lease,
or when the customer cancels the lease, or if the customer defaults on the lease, A
will sell the vehicle within 30 days. Under a terminal rental adjustment clause, if
the net sales proceeds (sales price less A's selling expenses) exceed the projected
value of the automobile at the end of the lease (or a predetermined amount in the
event of a cancellation or early termination of the lease), A will credit the customer
with an amount equal to the excess. Correspondingly, if the net sales proceeds are
less than that amount, the customer will pay an amount equal to the shortfall to A.
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sale,17 0 or a credit1 to the lessee on his purchase of the used vehicle or
17
another vehicle.
Congress added section 168(f)(13) to the Code in the Tax Reform Act of 1984.172 Section 168(f)(13) grants lease status to a
"qualified motor vehicle operation agreement" containing a terminal
rental adjustment clause, i.e., a residual value guarantee clause, if,
but for that clause, the agreement would be treated as a lease. A
"qualified motor vehicle operating agreement" must meet three requirements: 7 3 (1) the lessor must be personally liable for, or must
pledge property other than the leased property, to secure repayment
of amounts borrowed to finance the acquisition of the vehicle; (2) the
lessee must certify in writing an intention to utilize more than fifty
percent of the leased property in the lessee's trade or business; and,
(3) the lessor must have no knowledge that the lessee's certification
is false. A terminal rental adjustment clause is defined as a provision
that "permits or requires the rental price to be adjusted upward or
downward by reference to the amount realized by the lessor under
Under these facts, A has not retained significant and genuine attributes of ownership. Therefore, the agreement between A and its customer is a conditional sales
agreement, not a lease, and the customer, not A, is entitled to the cost recovery
deductions and the investment tax credit with respect to the automobile.
Id.
170. Id.; example (2) states:
Example (2). The facts are the same as example (1) except that upon termination
of the agreement, A will solicit bids to purchase the automobile. A will use the
highest bid to determine the actual value of the automobile for purposes of applying
the terminal rental adjustment clause. Under these facts A has not retained significant and genuine attributes of ownership. Accordingly, the results will be the same
as example (1).
Id,
171. Id.; example (3) states:
Example (3). The facts are the same as example (1) except that the terminal
rental adjustment clause only provides that the customer shall reimburse A if the
sales proceeds fall below the projected value of the automobile at the end of the
agreement. No credit is anticipated to be made to the customer if the sales proceeds
exceed the projected value (or predetermined amount in the event of a cancellation
or early termination of the agreement) of the automobile although A will, if the
customer so requests, credit the customer with an amount equal to the excess if the
customer buys the automobile or obtains another automobile from A. Under these
facts, A has not retained significant and genuine attributes of ownership. Therefore,
the agreement will be characterized as a conditional sales contract, not a lease, with
the same results as in example (1).
Id. at 52730-31.
172. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 32(a), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 494, 530 (codified at I.R.C. § 168(0(13) (West Supp. 1985)).
173. I,R.C. § 168(0(13)(B) (West Supp. 1985).
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the agreement upon sale or other disposition of such property. '7 4
Thus, the purchase option element of a residual guarantee arrangement is not part of the statutory definition and, therefore, is subject
to the "but for" requirement that the agreement otherwise qualify as

a true lease for tax purposes.
Congress bowed to long-standing industry practice by heading

off the Treasury Department's attempt to thwart the use of terminal
rental adjustment clauses. The legislative history notes that terminal
rental adjustment clauses provide a financial incentive for the user to
keep the vehicle in good repair." 5 Although Congress did not overrule existing case law or preclude Treasury regulations from treating

leases containing terminal rental adjustment clauses as conditional
sales,176 it created a safe harbor to protect standard industry practice. The legislative history specifically disavows any inferences as to
the tax consequences of such clauses outside of the confines of the
17
statutory safe harborY.
The manner in which the lessee benefits from residual value appreciation need not be limited to acquiring permanent possession of

the leased asset. Assuming the vehicle has appreciated in excess of
the stipulated value and is not unique, the lessee can easily take the

cash received from the lessor and apply it toward the purchase of a
substantially similar vehicle in terms of model, year, mileage and
general operating condition. Furthermore, even in the absence of a
purchase option, the lessor will most likely sell the vehicle to the
lessee for the stipulated amount

other interested buyer.

17

9

118

whether or not the lessor has an-

In sum, a residual value guarantee clause

174. I.R.C. § 168(f)(13)(C)(i) (West Supp. 1985).
175. See General Explanation, supra note 40, at 87.
176. Id. at 86.
177. Id. at 88.
178. The following equation proves the point: Fair Market Value (FMV) of vehicle minus (FMV of vehicle minus Stipulated Amount, i.e., residual guarantee) equals Stipulated
Amount. For example, if the lessee agreed that the vehicle would be worth $1,000 at lease
expiration, but the vehicle was actually worth $1,500, the lessor would only net $1,000 upon
resale to a third party, since the lessee would be entitled to a $500 credit under the residual
guarantee clause. The lessor will probably prefer to sell the vehicle to the lessee for $1,000 due
to the likelihood of lower transaction costs.
179. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.168(f)(8)-12(c), supra note 165. According to example (1),
supra note 169, the lease will be recharacterized as a sale if the lessor sells the property to a
third party at the end of the lease and credits or charges the lessee with the difference between
the sales proceeds and the guaranteed residual. The Regulation fails to provide for the possibility that the lessee may conduct the sale. The Treasury probably does not intend to distinguish
between the two; in any event, tax law would treat the lessor as the real seller on an agency or
conduit theory.
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is even more effective than a fixed price purchase option in transferring the risks of ownership to the lessee. The inclusion of such a
clause should cause the transaction to be characterized as a sale.
Alternatively, a residual value guarantee clause that compensates the lessor for excessive depreciation, without a reciprocal benefit to the lessee for residual value appreciation,'" ° should not cause
the lease to be cast as a sale. Vehicle depreciation may be measured
in increments of time and mileage. Although external market forces
such as economic conditions and changing consumer preferences affect residual value, accumulated mileage is a dominating influence,
together with vehicle maintenance, on depreciation and residual
value. 8 ' A residual value guarantee clause limited to compensating
the lessor would effectively convert time-based rent to mileage-based
rent. 8 2 The lessee should be required to pay the greater of either the
total rent computed over time or the total rent computed by multiplying total mileage by a fixed rate. Inclusion of the actual residual
value in the computation would probably alert the Service, 183 and
would offer the lessor little added protection against residual value
decline. In any event, even if the residual value were the measuring
stick for the lessee's payment, courts would be unlikely to characterize the transaction as a sale where the lessee is not entitled to either
ultimate possession or its monetary equivalent.
Under the foregoing analysis, Congress was too generous in enacting section 168(f)(13). Even Congress' stated purpose of ensuring
proper vehicle maintenance by lessees could have been accomplished
by permitting transfer of only the downside risk to the lessee. This
would protect the lessor from excessive vehicle use and improper vehicle maintenance by the lessee without departing from economic
substance principles.
180. For example, a cash rebate or discount on the lease or purchase of another vehicle
would constitute a reciprocal lessee benefit.
181.

Tax law implicitly recognizes this by permitting standardized mileage allowances

instead of separately computed depreciation, maintenance, repairs, etc., in certain situations.
See Rev. Proc, 82-61, 1982-2 C.B. 849.

182. Admittedly, such a residual guarantee clause would not perfectly convert timebased rent to mileage-based rent. In practice, however, the correlation would be very strong.

Another view in support of a residual value guarantee clause limited to insuring the lessor's risk is that such a clause merely burdens the lessee with the maintenance and repair

obligations commonly shifted to the lessee in a net lease. The lessee is charged with the cost of
inadequately discharging its obligation during the lease term.

183. The Service could argue that the lease transfers risk of loss and, hence, ownership
to the lessee by shielding the lessor from residual value decline.
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B.

Right to Possessionfor Substantially All of an Asset's
Useful Life

The amount of the lessor's residual interest is highly relevant to
the classification of the lease for tax purposes. If the lessor lacks a
significant residual interest in the asset, the lease is indistinguishable
from a sale and tax law should characterize the transaction as such.
1. Lease Term Length. - There is little case law discussing the
impact of leases whose terms approximate the useful life of the property.184 The Service guidelines, however, require that leveraged
equipment lease terms not exceed eighty percent of the useful life to
qualify for an advanced ruling.1 5 The Service has expressed no opinion on leases of real property.

86

It is economically sound for a lease which entitles the lessee to
possess the leased asset for substantially all of the asset's useful life,

leaving the lessor without a significant residual interest, to be labeled
a sale. 187 The tax treatment will then match the economic substance

of the transaction because a lessor deprived of a substantial residual
effectively closes out his investment in the property.188 There are two
184. Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1944), represents
one of the few cases where the Commissioner argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the length of
the lease term should be compared with the useful life of the property. The issue in Alaska
Realty was whether a particular lease provision shielded the lessor from risk of depreciable
loss. Id. See infra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
185. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(l)(C) at 715. If the leased property has a
useful life of less than five years, the remaining useful life at the expiration of the lease term
must equal at least one year. Id. Technically, the requirements of Rev. Proc. 75-21 are not
substantive law; they are only guidelines for obtaining an advance ruling. Id., § 3.
186. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 3, at 715, sought to clarify ambiguities in the
scope of Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39. Rev. Rul. 55-540 expressly applies to equipment
leases. Id. at § (1). But see Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sale-leasebacks: An Analysis of These
TransactionsAfter the Lyon Decision, 45 J. TAX'N 146, 147 n.1 (1976). The authors assert
that Rev. Proc. 75-21 also applies to real estate. Id. They sharply dispute the relevance of
personal property guidelines to the real property setting because real property customarily has
a longer average useful life and is more likely to have a residual value. Id. However, the
guidelines in Rev. Proc. 75-21 are phrased in percentages, not absolute numbers, which makes
it difficult to understand the authors' point. Rosenberg and Weinstein cite a letter written by
the Director of the Corporate Tax Division of the IRS, expressing the view that some, if not
many, of the ruling guidelines articulated in Rev. Proc. 75-21 apply to both real and personal
property. Id. This is the better view.
187. See Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19.
188. The lessor will compute the return on his investment based upon the lease payments. In closing out his investment, the lessor does not necessarily assume the passive status
of a net lessor. Indeed, he may still possess some ownership responsibilities - such as maintenance, repair, etc. - but he no longer possesses material risks and rewards of ownership, other
than the risk of the lessee's default; thus, the lessor should no longer be considered the true
owner of the property. Courts have acknowledged that the lessor lacks a depreciable interest,
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ways to determine when this occurs: (1) by comparing the length of
the lease term with the expected useful life of the property, or (2) by
comparing the value of the lessor's residual interest with the original
cost of the property.18 The latter method is imprecise because it
compares a future dollar (value of residual interest) with a present
dollar (original cost). The more accurate comparison is between the
present value of the residual interest and the property's original cost,
because the more distant in time the lessee's residual interest, the

smaller that interest will be. 190 Neither method standing alone, however, produces acceptable results. Because the formula is expressed
in dollars, rather than time, a comparison of the value of the lessor's
residual interest with the original cost of the property more accurately determines when a lessor has effectively closed out his investment; it can also produce harsh results. Hypothesize, for example, a
twenty-five year lease on an office building with a forty-five year useful life and a minimum requirement that the present value of the
but only in the context of a purchaser of real estate subject to an existing leasehold. See, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954);
Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1956). In other cases allowing the lessor depreciation deductions, the courts based their decisions on the effect of asset replacement clauses. See cases cited infra note 256.
Suppose the lessor is denied depreciation deductions on the ground that he sold the leased
property: Is the lessee entitled to the deductions? The Supreme Court, in Weiss v. Wiener,
279 U.S. 333 (1929), said no. See also New York Cent. R.R. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 247
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 653 (1935). The Wiener Court contended that the lessee had
invested no capital in the property, a prerequisite for entitlement to the depreciation deduction.
279 U.S. at 335-36. The Court apparently failed to consider the possibility that rent payments
might be a capital investment. See infra notes 241-51 and accompanying text. This questionable assumption led subsequent courts to conclude that neither the lessor nor the lessee is entitled to the depreciation deduction. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R., 79 F.2d at 251.
An asset's true economic depreciation follows an accelerated course of depreciation.-See,
e.g., Kahn, supra note 48. If this is true, the present value of the residual of an asset after 80%
of its useful life has expired will be miniscule; therefore, the lessor should not be considered
the tax owner of the property. If Professor Chirelstein's sinking-fund model of depreciation,
see M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 27, which postulates that an asset depreciates faster in the out
years of an asset's useful life, represents a more accurate description, the maximum lease
term/useful life ratio tolerated under new true lease guidelines should be raised. The controversy over the appropriate model of depreciation to govern tax expenditure classifications has
sparked lively debate. See, e.g., Blum, Accelerated Depreciation:A Proper Allowance For
Measuring Net Income?!!, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1172 (1980); Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation
Revisited - A Reply To Professor Blum, 78 MicH. L. REV. 1185 (1980).
189. Rev. Ruls. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, and 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19 adopt the former
method. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67 § 4(1)(C), at 715-16, adopts both.
190. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(1)(C), at 715-16, fails to incorporate both
present value discounting and inflation. Accurate comparison of residual value and original
cost requires discounting the residual value at the "real" rate of interest (i.e., nominal interest
rate minus inflation).
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residual equal or exceed ten percent of original cost. At a six percent
discount rate and an expected residual value, ignoring inflation, of
forty percent of original cost, the transaction would be deemed a
sale, which is too harsh a result. 191
A better means of ensuring both accurate and fair results would
be to employ both measurement methods in conjunction with one
another, rather than in the alternative. Under this analysis, a lease
would violate the residual value requirement only if the lease term
exceeded a specified percentage of the asset's useful life and the present value of the residual fell below the specified percentage of the

original cost. 192 This would permit uniform application to both per193
sonal property and real property.

Despite the usefulness of the conjunctive test, there is a need for
an upper limit on lease term length, because the present value of the

lessor's residual interest in a long term lease is too minute to distinguish between a lease and a sale.19 4 For example, if the anticipated
191. The present value of $1 to be received in 25 years at a 6% discount rate is $.233.
Thus, if the original cost of the office building was $1,000,000, the present value of the
$400,000 residual value would be $93,200, which is less than the 10% of original cost threshhold for true lease treatment.
192. This improves on Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(l)(C), at 715-16, by requiring a present value dollar comparison of residual value and current cost. Tax law has been
slow to incorporate present value concepts long familiar to economists. See generally Canellos
& Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After
1982, 38 TAx L. REv. 565 (1983). The Tax Reform Act of 1984 has revised much of the tax
code to account for the time value of money. See J. EusTicE, supra note 36, ch.2.
193. The conjunctive test does not work with land leases because the useful life of land
is indeterminate.
Present value analysis underscores the economic folly of treating a 99 year lease of real
property as a true lease. Precisely where the dividing line is between significant and insignificant residual values is admittedly an arbitrary decision. Arbitrary cutoffs, however, characterize much of tax law. The line being drawn today, nonetheless, is indefensible because of the
failure to incorporate present value concepts.
Leases of land should not be excluded from a minimum residual value requirement incorporating present value concepts. It is absurd to treat a 999 year lease as a true lease as the
Fourth Circuit did in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936). This can be corrected be either extending a minimum residual
value to real property, as well as personal property leases, or by establishing a maximum lease
term length to be accorded true lease treatment.
194. The lease more closely resembles a sale when the rentals are noncancelable. If the
lease is cancelable only upon the occurrence of a remote contingency or any other condition
which makes cancellation unlikely, the lease should be considered noneancelable. Tax law
could profit by borrowing the definition of "noncancelable" from the accounting profession.
See Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) Statement No. 13, 15(f) (1976).
Shifting the risk of loss from obsolescence to the lessee is obviously helpful to the sale
analogy; the converse, however, is not true. Even if the lessor retains the risk of depreciation
and obsolescence loss, the lessee acquires the most important right of ownership: The use of
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residual value of a building in fifty years, ignoring inflation, is fifty
percent of the original cost of the building, the present value of the
residual at a six percent discount rate is only 2.7% of original cost. A
line must be drawn at some point to determine how much residual
value retained by the lessor qualifies the transaction as a true lease.

Tax law often draws arbitrary lines that result in different tax consequences; those lines are and should be drawn at the most sensible
places. It seems senseless to have a rule that permits any amount of

residual value retained by the lessor, no matter how small, to qualify
the transaction as a lease. A more sensible rule would require the
retention by the lessor of some significant amount of residual value,
perhaps five percent of original cost on a present value basis, thus
unifying, at least conceptually, the tax treatment of leases of real
195
and personal property.
2. Limited Use Property. -

The Service has declined to issue

advance rulings on leases involving limited use property since the
lessee has the benefit of use of the property for substantially its entire useful life.19 In explaining its position, the Service posits that a
transaction permitting the lessee to lease the property for substan-

tially its entire useful life is a transfer of equitable ownership.197
Congress' enactment provides a safe haven that would allow leasing
of limited use property, but the effective date of the legislation is
delayed until 1988.198 The Code defines limited use property as propthe property for substantially its entire useful life. The lessor's retention of depreciable loss
risk is illusory because she has invariably recovered her investment with a profit by the time
the lease expires. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Obsolescence risk is too remote
to award the lessor ownership status in the face of the lessee's more compelling position. See
Infra text accompanying note 300.
195. Rev. Proc. 75-21, § 4(1)(C), 1975-1 C.B. 715, which applies to personal property,
requires a lessor applying for an advanced ruling to represent and demonstrate that the property's residual value is at least 20 percent of original cost, ignoring inflation or deflation.
196. Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647, modified by Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731
[hereinafter cited as Rev. Proc. 76-30]. See also Rev. Rul. 82-61, 1982-1 C.B. 13; Rev. Rul.
57-371, 1957-2 C.B. 214.
In Rev. Rul. 82-61, the Service held that an undivided interest in an electric generating
facility did not constitute "limited use property" as defined by Rev. Proc. 76-30. Rev. Rul. 8261, 1982-1 C.B, 13, 16. This was an extension of the Service view expressed in Rev. Proc. 7630 § 5, examples (5) & (6), which dealt with leases of entire electric generating facilities. The
Service ruled for the lessee-taxpayer in Rev. Rul. 82-61 because the lease term length was not
excessive, id. at 13, 15; the lessor, at the end of the lease term, could take and dispose of its
ratable share of the power generated by the facility, id. at 14, 15; and the lessor's interest was
disposable to a third party. Id.
197. Rev. Proc. 76-30, supra note 196, § 3 at 648.
198. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 12(a)(1), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.,
& AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 494, 503 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168 note (West Supp.
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erty "of a type not readily usable by any person other than the
Lessee."19 9 This definition should encompass any property where the

lessor's reclamation and refurbishing costs exceed the asset's realizable value upon disposition to a third party, whether or not the asset
is physically attached to the lessee's premises. The law, however, is
not clear.

Limited use property locks the lessor into reletting or selling the
property to the lessee because of the commercial infeasibility of
transferring possession of the property to another party. 20 0 Thus, the

lessee becomes entitled to use the property for the remainder of its
useful life. A monopoly on the useful life of the property by the
lessee also results from lease terms of excessive length; however, in

the limited use property situation the monopoly arises by fiat, rather
than by contractual right.

In Estate of Starr v. Commissioner,0 1 possibly the only recorded case to squarely address the characterization of limited use

property leases, 0 2 the deceased taxpayer's company (the lessee)
leased a fire sprinkler system that the lessor installed in the lessee's

plant.2 3 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the lessor would probably
never remove the system, even though the lessor reserved the con1985)).
199. I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. 11983) (effective Jan. 1, 1988). In Rev. Proc. 7630, supra note 196, § 2 at 648, the Service defined limited use property as "property not
expected to be useful to or useable by the lessor at the end of the lease term except for purposes of continued leasing or transfer to a member of the lessee group." Id.
200. See Rev. Proc. 76-30, supra note 196, § 5, examples (3) & (4), at 648.
201. 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'g, 30 T.C. 856 (1958).
202. In Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324 (1971), affd per curiam,
496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974), a case which could have been decided upon limited use property
considerations, the lessor, an accrual basis taxpayer, constructed custom-made electric, neon
and plastic signs and displays, which it leased and sold to customers. Id. at 1326. The signs
had no residual value to Electric & Neon (E & N), id.; upon lease expiration or lessee default,
E & N would junk the sign. Id. E & N treated the construction costs of each sign as current
expense, but reported lease payments as income over the life of the lease. Id. at 1326-27. The
Commissioner, pursuant to his authority under I.R.C. § 446(b) (1982), contended that E&N's
method of accounting did not clearly reflect income because it should have depreciated the
signs over their useful life. The Tax Court agreed. Id. at 1324.
Instead, the Commissioner could have attacked E & N's income reporting on "limited use
property" grounds. The transaction would then have been recast as a sale, and E & N's failure
to elect installment reporting under I.R.C. § 453 (1982) (current version at I.R.C. § 453
(West Supp. 1985)) would have forced it to recognize all of its income in the year of sale.
Since the revision of I.R.C. § 453 (1982) in the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), installment reporting is automatic unless the taxpayer elects out under § 453(d) (1982). See supra
note 192.
203. 274 F.2d at 294.
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tractual right to remove the system if the lessee chose not to renew
the lease. 0 4 Both the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Starr and the Service in Revenue Procedure 76-30, concluded that the central feature
of limited use property leases is that the leased asset either attaches
to or becomes dependent upon an asset held by the lessee. 20 5 The
property is either incapable of being relet to a third party 06 or may
only be relet to a third party at a cost to the lessor in excess of the
asset's realizable value. 07
The New York State Bar Association s O8 recently issued a propo-

sal on how to prevent a lessee from using limited use property after
the lease expires; the Association asserted that the combination of
contractual rights and the Association's suggested appraisal mechanism would prevent such use if the lessee fails to renew the lease or
purchase the asset at the appraised value.2 0 9 The appraisal mechanism would ensure the lessor a substantial residual value at the end
of the lease term.
The principal flaw in the New York State Bar Association's
proposal, however, is that it does not alter the probability of the
lessee's continued use of the property for the property's entire useful
life. 210 The lessee must have the right not to exercise the option; otherwise, the transaction must be characterized as a sale. If the lessee
refuses to exercise the option, the lessor's only motivation to reclaim
the property will be revenge. A lessor will not reclaim an asset with
a negative residual value, i.e., an asset that costs more to reclaim
and refurbish than the asset is worth. The appraisal mechanism fails
204. Id. at 295.
205. Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959). Accord Rev. Proc.
76-30, supra note 196, § 5, example (2), at 648.
206. See supra note 205.
207. See Rev. Proc. 76-30, supra note 196, § 5, examples (1) & (5) at 648. Cf. Electric
& Neon, Inc., v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324 (1971), a.ff'd per curiam, 496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.
1974).
208. Committee on Depreciation & Investment Credit, Comments on the Treasury Regulations Project on True Leases, 1983 N.Y. ST. B.A. TAX SEc. 1.
209. id. at 20.
210. See Rev. Proc, 76-30, supra note 196, § 3 at 648. The proposal does not resolve the
problem of disposability of the property to third parties. If the lessor and lessee fail to agree on
a renewal rate or purchase price, the lessor can do one of three things: (1) remove the property, if feasible (he will presumably scrap the property once removed because of its limited use
character); (2) leave the property in the lessee's hands but enjoin him from using it; or (3)
allow the lessee to use the property and sue him for unjust enrichment, forcing the court to
establish a fair market value for the property. What the lessor cannot feasibly do, however, is
dispose of the property to a third party if the leased property is attached to other property
owned by the lessee. See Estate of Starr,274 F.2d 294.
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to make repossession by the lessor economically attractive.

3. Renewal Options. - A renewal option offers the lessee an
extension of the lease in exchange for additional rentals. The additional rentals may be fixed by the lease agreement or determined by

the fair value at the time of renewal. If a renewal option is set at a
fixed price below the fair rental value for the renewal term, and the
length of the entire lease term is excessive in relation to the asset's
useful life, the lessee should be deemed the tax owner of the asset.
The courts2 11 and the Service 212 concur that bargain renewal options may cause a transaction to be characterized as a sale for tax
purposes. In Revenue Ruling 60-122, for example, the Service con-

sidered two lease agreements with bargain renewal options. In the
first lease, the property's useful life exceeded the total lease term

including renewal periods; in the second lease, the total lease term
covered substantially all of the property's useful life. The Service
ruled that the first transaction was a lease and the second transac213
tion was a sale.

Three elements of purchase option analysis also apply to re211.

Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539 (D. Vt. 1964),

affd per curtam, 342 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965); Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294
(9th Cir. 1959); Home News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 834 (1969).
But see Lockhart Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1971); Gem, Inc. v.
United States, 192 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Miss. 1961); Kansas City S. Ry. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 1067 (1981); LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 39 (1974) (either the renewals were
related to fair market value or there was no reasonable certainty that renewal option at a
reduced rate would be exercised).
The critical fact that distinguishes Kansas City S. Ry. from Estate of Starr and Mt.
Mansfield Television is that the Tax Court in Kansas City S. Ry. found that the "[lessor]
retained a realistic residual interest in the equipment," Kansas City S. Ry., 76 T.C. at 1099,
and had resold many pieces of equipment for "significant amounts" of money. Id. The court
evidently believed that the taxpayer had met its burden to show that it did not retain the
leased property for the entire useful life, despite the Commissioner's argument that the
"'lessee retained the equipment and used it during its entire useful life and also during its
entire economic life.'" Id. at 1098. In Estate of Starr and Mt. Mansfield Television, on the
other hand, the lessee retained possession of the property during its entire useful life, tantamount to ownership of the property. See id. at 1100 n.19 (cases distinguished from Kansas
City S. Ry.).
212. Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56.
213. In treating the first lease as a true lease, the Service noted that the useful life of
the property was substantially longer than the sum of the primary and renewal terms. Rev.
Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56, 57. The Service recast the second lease as a sale because the
lessee could renew the lease indefinitely at a rental slightly above the lessor's ordinary maintenance charge. Id. at 57. The Service presumed in both cases that the lessee would renew the
lease for the entire useful life of the property. But see Gem, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.
Supp. 841 (N.D. Miss. 1961) (placing burden on Service to prove "reasonable certainty" of
renewal). See infra note 215.
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newal options. 214 First, a renewal option becomes a bargain renewal
option when the renewal rate falls below the present expected fair

rental value on the renewal date, thereby inducing the lessee to exercise the option to reap the economic benefit. 215 Even if the lessee no
longer has use for the asset, he may be able to sublet the asset to a

third party at a profit. Second, expected fair rental value is as difficult to ascertain as expected fair market value. It may be easier ad-

ministratively to aggregate all fixed renewal option terms when measuring whether the lease covers substantially all of an asset's useful
life than to sort out bargain renewal from non-bargain renewal terms
through difficult future value determinations.2 16 Third, a fair market
value renewal option should never cause a lease to be recharacterized
as a sale. The lack of an economic inducement to renew the lease
breaks the connection between the original lease term and the renewal term; upon renewal, the lessee is treated as though he never
had possession of the property. 217 Thus, a party leasing an asset with
a five year useful life for a one year term, with three optional one
year renewal terms (at the then fair rental value), will be treated
similarly to one leasing four different assets for four successive one
year periods.
While the analysis of renewal and purchase options is similar,
214. See supra text accompanying notes 127-43.
215. In Gem, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Miss. 1961), the taxpayerlessee entered into a 20 year lease for a building that had a 40 year useful life. The lease
contained an option to renew the lease for three additional 20 year periods, and one 19 year
period, Id. at 841, at sharply reduced rentals. The Commissioner, contending that the taxpayer
was acquiring an "equity" in the property, disallowed the taxpayer's rental deductions and
substituted a slower depreciation schedule. The court, finding for the taxpayer, employed a
"reasonable certainty" test, derived from the following language in the regulations:
fUInless the lease has been renewed or the facts show with reasonable certainty
that the lease will be renewed, the cost or other basis of the lease, or the cost of
improvements shall be spread only over the number of years the lease has to run
without taking into account any right of renewal.
Id. at 843 n.4 (quoting language from Treas. Reg. § 1.162(b)(2), T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52)
(emphasis added by the court). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.178-3(a) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.178-3(a) specifically applies to determine the appropriate length of time
over which to recover the cost of depreciable capital improvements made by a lessee. It does
not apply to determine the character of rental payments. Neither Rev. Rul. 60-122, issued the
same year as Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(b), T.D. 6520, 1962-1 C.B. 52, and cited by the Gem
court, nor Rev. Proc. 75-21, refer to the "reasonable certainty" test, which the Gem court
thought "must necessarily apply to rental payments." Gem, 192 F.Supp. at 846. Gem has not
been followed by the courts and is simply wrong.
216, Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(2), at 716, chooses the former approach. But
see Committee on Depreciation & Investment Credit, supra note 208, at 24-25.
217, Accord Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(2), at 716 (lease term does not include
renewal or extension periods for options at fair rental value).
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differences do exist. The key factor in analyzing bargain renewal options is the transfer of residual value, not residual value risk (as in a
purchase option), to the lessee. Thus, if a two year lease of property
having a five year useful life contains a one dollar purchase option,
the transaction is deemed a sale; if the lease contains a one dollar
renewal option for one year, the transaction is a lease. The Service,
however, will spread the rent deductions evenly over the three year
term.218 In sum, the distinctive ingredient in a renewal option case
which characterizes a lease as a sale is an aggregate lease term
which is excessive in relation to the property's useful life.
C. Risk of Depreciable Loss
Another significant factor for lease classification purposes in219
volves the placement of the "burden," or risk, of depreciable loss.
If the burden shifts to the lessee, the lessor no longer deserves depreciation deductions nor qualifies for tax status as an owner; the transaction should be characterized as a sale. Arguably, the lease provisions discussed in sections III, A. and III, B. 220 also cause a transfer
of risk of depreciable loss to the lessee whenever a sale occurs, because the tax status of the owner vests in the lessee. The lease provisions discussed here operate differently; rather than providing the
lessee with permanent or extensive dominion over the property, the
lessee guarantees the lessor that the asset will be undiminished in
value at the lease's expiration. An additional source of confusion
arises from the fact that in most of the relevant cases, the lease term
length is excessive; this factor alone should result in recharacterization of the lease as a sale. The cases, with rare exception, do not
even regard lease term length as an issue. The lease provisions shifting the risk of depreciable loss should be separately considered because their relevance is independent of the usual long-term lease
setting.
Three different lease provisions protect the lessor from depreciable loss: (1) clauses that require the lessee to return to the lessor at
lease end an asset equal in value to the asset originally leased; 221 (2)
clauses that require the lessee to return the property in as good condition as when leased and to replace the property as it wears out or
218. See
may affect the
219. See
220. See
221. See

Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960-1 C.B. 56. New I.R.C. § 467(0 (West Supp. 1985)
treatment of this transaction.
supra note 21.
supra notes 120-83, 184-218 and accompanying text.
infra notes 224, 225-51 and accompanying text.
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at fixed time intervals;22 and (3) clauses that require the lessee to
make improvements to the property.22 3 These classifications are by
no means mutually exclusive; a lease provision may include any or
all of the above clauses.
1. Lease Provisions Requiring the Return of an Asset of Equal
Value. - The first category may be coined "the missing depreciation deduction." A provision in this category may require the lessee
of a building to return either that building, or a new one, equal in
value to the original, in order to protect the lessor from a decline in
the leased property's value. When the lessor shields himself entirely
from depreciable loss by employing such a lease provision, tax law
allows neither the lessor nor the lessee to claim depreciation deductions on the property. 224 After the lease expires, the lessor may
amortize his original cost over the asset's remaining useful life.
The seminal case in this category is Weiss v. Wiener.225 The
leases in Wiener ran for ninety-nine years each, covering thirteen
parcels of real estate.12 6 Wiener, the lessee and taxpayer in the suit,
acquired the leases by assuming noncancelable rent obligations; no
bonus payments were made.227 Each lease required the lessee to replace the building on the premises with a building of equal or
greater value in the event of a fire or other destruction. 2 The lease
also obligated the lessee to maintain the buildings on the various
parcels at their "fair cost or value. ' 229 Some leases specified that the
lessee was required to erect new buildings at an agreed upon future
date. 23 0 During the taxable years in litigation, however, the lessee
222.

See infra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.

223. See infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., cases holding that the lessee should not receive a depreciation deduction:
Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333 (1929); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d

309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936); New York Cent. R.R. v. Commissioner, 79
F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 653 (1935) (no depreciation deduction for lessor or

lessee). See also, e.g., cases holding that the lessor should not receive the depreciation deduction: Royal St. Louis Co. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1978); Kem v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1970); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 897
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 601 (1935); Commissioner v. Terre Haute Elec. Co., 67 F.2d
697 (7th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 624 (1934); Appeal of A. Wilhelm Co., 6 B.T.A. 1
(1927).
225. 279 U.S. 333 (1929), revg 27 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1928), rev'g 17 F.2d 650 (N.D.
Ohio 1926).
226. Wiener, 17 F.2d at 651.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Wiener, 27 F.2d at 200.
230. Id.
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made none of the capital expenditures called for under the leases. 231
Of the thirteen leases, seven were assigned, cancelled or surrendered
by the lessee after the years in dispute.232 The lessee took depreciation deductions on the leased buildings; the Department of Internal
Revenue, however, disallowed the deductions. 3
The district court held that the lessee's depreciation deductions
were properly disallowed. 234 The court stressed that the lessee had
not invested its capital in the buildings and that the lessee's obligation to make capital expenditures was contingent and remote. 35 The
Sixth Circuit reversed 236 and held - based on a close reading of the
statutory language of the section authorizing the depreciation deduction 237 - that the taxpayer's right to the deduction did not depend
upon a capital investment, but rather required that the taxpayer
"suffer and bear the burden of the loss or depreciation,"'2 38 which the
lease allocated to the lessee.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and affirmed the
district court's decision in favor of the Department.2 39 Justice
Holmes, delivering the opinion for the Court, followed the reasoning
of the district court, noting that the lessee had not invested its capital and was only contingently obligated to do so in the future.240
Two aspects of the Wiener case warrant comment. First, both
the district court and Supreme Court placed greater emphasis on the
lessee's lack of capital investment than on the lessee's clear obligation to protect the lessor against depreciable loss.2 41 The lessee's obligations were not contingent since a depreciable loss was certain to
231.
232.

Id.
Wiener, 17 F.2d at 651.

233.

Wiener, 27 F.2d at 200.

234.

Wiener, 17 F.2d at 650.

235.

Id. at 651. The court emphasized that "the important fact is that.

. .

the plaintiff

did not make any such capital expenditures . . . . It will be time enough to consider the
question of allowing depreciation, under any of the conditions above stated, when the contingency shall have happened." Cf. Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963),
aff'd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964) (a contingency - employee severence pay

liability -

is not to be included in the basis of assets until the liability actually arises).

236.

Wiener, 27 F.2d at 201.

237.

Section 214(a)(8) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which allowed a deduction for the

"exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence," is similar to the present I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982).
238. Wiener, 27 F.2d at 201. The court also noted the statutory requirement that the
property be used in a trade or business of the taxpayer. Id.
239. Wiener, 279 U.S. at 336.
240. Id.
241. See supra notes 235, 240 and accompanying text.
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occur. 242 Subsequent events do not transform certain liabilities into
contingent ones; instead, such events should discharge or postpone
the liabilities. 243 Discharge and assumption of indebtedness often
serve as the consideration for conveyances of property, which is arguably what occurred in Wiener.244 Furthermore, the taxpayer in
Wiener attempted the impossible: He sought tax status as both
lessee and owner in the same transaction. He not only deducted de-

preciation on the buildings, but deducted the rent as well.245
The Supreme Court's holding in Weiss v. Wiener is questionable
when compared with cases disallowing depreciation deductions to the
lessor during the lease term where the lease wholly protects the lessor from depreciable loss. The cases suggest that the depreciation

deduction suddenly disappears2 46 because the lessor has the capital
investment, yet the lessee sustains the risk of depreciable loss. The
capital investment without the risk of depreciable loss or the risk
without the capital investment keeps either party from claiming
depreciation.24
Case discussions generally avoid the larger question of whether
the transaction should be recharacterized as a sale. If it is a sale, the
Wiener dilemma is solved; the agreement to pay "rent" transforms
242. The depreciation deduction is allowable even if no depreciable loss actually occurs
due to an increase in the fair market value of the asset. See Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). Cf. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(C), 48 Fed. Reg.
9871 (1983) (status unchanged) (proposed Mar. 9, 1983) (special allocations of partnership
depreciation deductions are deemed to have substantial economic effect irrespective of likelihood of decrease in property's market value).
243. Compare, e.g., the treatment of contingent liabilities in basis of assets acquired in
Albany Car Wheel Co. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affd per curiam, 333 F.2d 653
(2d Cir. 1964) (contingent employee severance pay liability not included in basis of assets until
liability actually arises), with the treatment of bad debt discharges under § 166(a) (1982)
(reversing prior inclusion in income of note or account receivable on theory that subsequent
events suggest uncolleetibility of item; otherwise, taxpayer redress available under § 1341
(1982) or through amendment of prior, erroneous return, see Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a)
(1957)). The district court and Supreme Court in Wiener improperly looked to subsequent
events to gauge whether the taxpayer's liabilities were contingent at the time of contracting.
Accord Gem, Inc. v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 841, 846 (N.D. Miss. 1961) (determining
probability of renewal option exercise from facts known during taxable year at issue).
244. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. The lessee conveyed his leasehold interests in exchange for assumption or cancellation (on reconveyance to the lessor) of his indebtedness under the lease agreements.
245. Wiener, 17 F.2d at 650, 651. The lessee also deducted the depreciation on improvements he made, id. at 651, but this does not constitute a double deduction.
246. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936). The lessor and lessee were both before the court, but the Fourth
Circuit denied depreciation deductions to either party. Id. at 310.
247. See, e.g., id.
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into the capital investment, thereby entitling the lessee to the depreciation deduction. In effect, Wiener was an easy case, since the lessee
had use of the property for ninety-nine years - far in excess of the

useful life of the buildings 248 - and the lessee agreed to assume all
risk of depreciable loss. The lessor retained only legal title.2 49 Wiener, the lessee, was the owner of the property for tax purposes; thus,
Wiener's rental deduction should have been disallowed.

The Code establishes a distinct relationship between a sale of
property and entitlement to the depreciation deduction. For example,
in section 167(g), the basis used to determine the depreciation deduction is the adjusted basis determined in section 1011 to compute
gain or loss on the sale or other disposition of property.25 0 It follows

from these Code sections that if property is sold, the seller may no
longer depreciate the property because the asset's basis has been removed from his tax books.
A consideration of the sale issue would broaden the court's focus and direct its attention to the principal parties of the transaction,

even though only one party is before the court. This would enable
the court to analyze the transaction as a whole, and to fully assess

the transaction's consequences. Consequently, a finding of a sale
would direct the lessor to realize a gain or loss, capital or ordinary,251 as well as the loss of depreciation deductions.
2. Lease Provisions Requiring the Preservation and Replace248. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
249. The subsequent reconveyances do not alter this conclusion. Wiener sold the underlying property instead of selling or abandoning his leasehold interests for tax purposes.
250. I.R.C. § 167(g) (1982) states that "[tihe basis on which exhaustion, wear and tear,
and obsolescence are to be allowed in respect of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for the purpose of determining the gain on the sale or other disposition of
such property."
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1982) also refers to § 1011 (1982) in the computation of gain or loss
from the "sale or other disposition of property."
The parochial approach of the courts in Weiss v. Wiener, see supra notes 225-49 and
accompanying text, to the depreciation deduction issue illustrates the consequence of failing to
establish a link between the deduction and property disposition sections of the Code. Courts
have generally tested the deductibility of rent to a lessee, or the character of payments received by a lessor under lease agreements that contain fixed price purchase options, by phrasing the issue quite correctly in lease versus sale terms. See cases cited supra notes 12, 17.
Strangely, courts have not followed this lead when faced with depreciable risk questions of
the Wiener variety, see cases cited supra note 224. This is probably because, at lease termination, the property reverts to the lessor. The proper result in Wiener would have been to capitalize the rent payments as installments on the acquisition of the buildings.
251. Ordinary income treatment will prevail if the asset does not qualify under § 1221
(1982) as a "capital asset" or the gain comes within I.R.C. §§ 1239, 1245 or 1250 (West 1982
& Supp. 1985).
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ment of the Property. - A typical lease clause requiring preservation and replacement of the leased property might read as follows:
"Lessee shall preserve, replace, renew and maintain the leased property, and upon reversion to the lessor, the property shall be in at
least as good condition as at the beginning of the term. 2 52 Courts
distinguish between an obligation regarding the quality of the property's condition upon return, and an obligation that identifies, explicitly or implicitly, a dollar value of the property upon return.253 An
obligation to keep property "in good order and repair" or return
property "in as good condition as when leased" is construed to require the lessee to repair and maintain the property, and perhaps
make necessary leasehold improvements.2 54 Courts have noted that
the lessor will still be entitled to a depreciation deduction because of
the inevitable deterioration of the property that occurs with the passage of time and the loss in property value due to technological improvements and changing consumer preferences.255
Lease provisions in this category, however, have received disparate treatment due to the courts' heavy reliance on factual findings
to decide the cases. If the court construes the clause to permit the
lessee to return property of lesser value than the property originally
leased, the court often allows the lessor to deduct the depreciation
actually suffered by him over the term of the lease.2 56 Alternatively,
if the court construes the lease provision as requiring the lessee to
252. This is a streamlined version of the lease clause in dispute in North Carolina Midland Ry. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 610, 611 (Ct. Cl. 1958).

253. See, e.g., Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1944);
North Carolina Midland Ry. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 610, 614 (Ct. C1. 1958). But see
Royal St. Louis, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that

phrase "first class condition" precluded economic loss and hence, lessor's depreciation
deduction).
254. See, e.g., Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944); North
Carolina Midland Ry. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 610 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Terminal Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935).
255. See cases cited supra note 254 and infra note 256. One route used by some courts

has been to find that the lease did not protect the lessor against "depreciation through obsolescence." Helvering v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 89 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1937). See also Terminal Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935). Depreciation and obsolescence are

two separate concepts, the former referring to the wear and tear on property caused by the
passage of time, the latter referring to periodic advances in technology that render property
undesirable and less valuable. The Code, however, provides for depreciation and obsolescence

in a single deduction. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982).
256. See, e.g., Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944);
Helvering v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 89 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1937); North Carolina Midland Ry.
v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 610 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Terminal Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 32

B.T.A. 623 (1935). See also Rev. Rul. 62-8, 1962-1 C.B. 31, 26 C.F.R. 1.167(a)-4.
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return property of equal value, the transaction should be treated as a
sale for tax purposes.257 The court may be influenced by the lease
term/useful life ratio2 58 or by the precise language of the lease provision, as well as by evidence of the parties' intent. 259 The court would

probably consider the lease term/useful life ratio relevant in a lease
provision to replace worn out property, since, if the lease term covers

the useful life of the property,260 the lessor is effectively shielded
261
from sustaining any depreciable loss.
257. See cases cited supra note 224. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 440 (1955)
(Income Tax-Deduction-Depreciation).
258. In Terminal Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935), a freight terminal was the subject of a 23 year lease, id. at 624-25, which required the lessee to maintain the
property in "equally as good and safe [a condition] as the same may be at this time [date of
lease], or may be put at any time during the continuance of this lease." Id. at 626. The useful
life of the property was 25 years at the inception of the lease. Id. The court held:
The probable physical life of the properties in question was somewhat longer than
the period of the lease. No doubt, by proper maintenance, they could be kept
throughout the period of the lease in a condition equally as good and safe as they
were at the beginning of the lease ....
It seems clear that the lessees were not
required by the terms of the lease to replace at the end of the lease the partially
worn out buildings with new ones.
Id. at 629-30. But see Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1944)
("The distinction which is sought to be drawn by the Commissioner, that the lease in the
Terminal case covered a period less than the useful life of the property, seems immaterial)."
259. See, e.g., Royal St. Louis, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (5th Cir.
1978); Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Rev.
Rul. 62-8, 1962-1 C.B. 31.
260. In Royal St. Louis, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1978), the court
denied the depreciation deduction to a hotel trade property lessor. The court reasoned that a
lease provision requiring the lessee to maintain the leased property in "first class condition"
precluded the lessor's economic loss. Id. at 1020. However, in Alaska Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944), the court upheld the lessor's depreciation deduction
where a 99 year lease, renewable forever, contained a lease provision similar to the one in
Royal St. Louis, Inc.. It appears that neither case was correctly decided. In Alaska Realty
Co., the lessee's obligation to replace worn-out property virtually eliminated the lessor's risk of
depreciable loss because the lessee would inevitably have to fully restore the property's value.
In Royal St. Louis, Inc., the property was leased in three year cycles; the lessee would not be
required to incur substantial restoration expenses because the property probably had a longer
useful life. Furthermore, the lease permitted the lessee to satisfy part of its rent obligation
through restoration expenses. Treatment of the restoration obligation as substitute rent seems
more plausible. Cf. M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, 277 (1938); Commissioner
v. Cunningham, 258 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1958) (agreement must disclose intent to treat improvements as rent). But see Rev. Proc. 79-48, § 3, 1979-2 C.B. 529, 530 (nonseverable improvements generally do not constitute rent).
261. From a transactional perspective, it is difficult to characterize a transaction where
the lessor shields himself from depreciable loss for a period of time substantially shorter than
the useful life of the property. The lessor may bear no risk of depreciable loss during the lease
term, but retain the risk of depreciable loss in a leased asset of substantial residual value at the
end of the lease term. Assuming the returned asset is the same as the one originally leased, it
is difficult to say that a sale has occurred. However, it is improper to permit the lessor to
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3. Lease Provisions Requiring Improvements to Property.

-

Case law on leasehold improvements and lease characterization is
minimal.26 2 The Service, however, considered the subject in Revenue
Procedure 79-48,263 and restricted lessee improvements to prevent

the lessee from acquiring an equity in the leased property. 264 Revenue Procedure 79-48, for example, distinguishes between severable
and nonseverable lessee improvements,265 and limits nonseverable
improvements to no more than ten percent of the property's cost. 266

Although Revenue Procedure 79-48 deals explicitly with leveraged
leases of personal property, 267 it is also relevant to nonleveraged
transactions.
The restrictions on leasehold improvements in Revenue Procedure 79-48 cannot be understood or justified without attempting to
deduct depreciation during the lease term because she lacks the risk of depreciable loss. To
illustrate the problem, assume a five year lease of widgets. The lessor has a $10,000 basis in
the widgets at the inception of the lease; the widgets are five year ACRS property with a 10
year useful life and no salvage value. The widgets' anticipated residual value at the end of the
five year lease is $4,000, but due to a lease provision requiring restoration of the widgets to
their original condition, the lessee will invest $6,000 (in current dollars) at or near the end of
the lease term. As a result, the useful life of the widgets will be extended five more years.
Although the lessor has shielded herself from risk of loss during the lease term, she retains the
risk of loss in $4,000 worth of residual value. Perhaps the parties should be viewed as coowners of the property in proportion to their risk positions in the property, i.e. 60/40 in favor
of the lessee. The lessee would be entitled to deduct ACRS during the first five years, and the
lessor would deduct her portion of the cost under ACRS over the second five years. Another
possible solution is for the lessor to be viewed as lending the asset to the lessee in exchange for
interest payments denominated as rent during the lease term. The $6,000 of restoration expenditures made by the "lessee" would be treated as repayment of the principal in kind. The
"lessor" would commence deducting depreciation upon the lessee's return of the asset.
262. See, e.g., Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 456 (1956);
Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940). See generally [1984] FED. TAxEs (P-H) %111, 84411,849, 15,354-15,357.
263. 1979-2 C.B. 529, modified by Rev. Proc. 81-71, 1981-2 C.B. 731.
264. Id. § 3 at 529-31.
265. Id. at 529-30. Severable improvements are defined as "readily removable without
causing material damage to the leased property." Id. at 529. Rev. Proc. 79-48 generally permits severable improvements with two minor restrictions. Id. Nonseverable improvements are
defined as "not readily removable without causing material damage to the property," id. at
530, and are subject to many restrictions. The first major restriction prohibits the lessee from
acquiring any equity in the property through receipt of compensation for its interest in the'
improvement. Id. Furthermore, the nonseverable improvement must meet either of two conditions: (1) it must be furnished to comply with some government regulations; id.; or (2) it must
not substantially increase the productivity or capacity of the property compared with the date
the property was first placed in service, or modify the property for a materially different use.
Id. ("An increase in productivity or capacity is substantial only if the increase is more than 25
percent."). Id.
266. Id. at 530.
267. Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529, modifying Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715.
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extract the purpose of the restrictions.2 68 The Service may be concerned that the lessor's requirement that leasehold improvements be

made by the lessee may be a disguised mechanism to ensure that the
lessee returns an asset at the lease-end equal in value to the asset
originally leased. 269 Lease obligations of this type shift risk of depreciable loss to the lessee and are inconsistent with a true lease. 270
Thus, Revenue Procedure 79-48 prohibits lessee improvements from

substantially increasing the productivity and capacity of the leased
property, and further limits the cost of improvements to no more
than ten percent of the cost of the property. 7 1 Revenue Procedure

79-48, however, does not apply to leases that do not contain a value
restoration clause. Without such a clause, the lessee's improvements

do not shield the lessor from the risk of depreciable loss because the
lessee has no obligation to furnish the improvements.

Moreover,

the twenty-five percent restrictions on productivity and capacity increases and the ten percent cost ceiling in Revenue Procedure 79-48

are needlessly arbitrary. The Service should determine on a case-bycase basis whether the lessee has completely restored the lost value
of the asset.
D. Insignificant Factors in Lease Analysis

Several of the factors used by courts to distinguish a lease from
a sale are arguably irrelevant to the analysis.27 3
268. One view is that the rules of Rev. Proc. 79-48 have no purpose. See Committee on
Depreciation & Investment Credit, supra note 208 at 29.
269. In addition, the Service may fear that lessee improvements may be used to disguise
a joint venture or co-ownership as a lease.
270. See supra notes 224-51 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
272. The appropriate time to measure risk allocation is at the inception of the agreement. Without a contractual obligation to require restoration of the leased asset's initial value,
the lessor cannot be assured that improvements made by the lessee will shield the lessor from
depreciable loss. The lessor is no more protected in this situation than when the lessor
purchases a building in an area of rapidly escalating real estate prices. The chance that the
market value will experience a decline is sufficient to warrant a depreciation allowance. Cf
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(C) 48 Fed. Reg. 9871 (1983) (status unchanged) (proposed Mar. 9, 1983) (for purposes of determining whether an allocation of an ACRS deduction to a partner has substantial economic effect, the decline in value is deemed to occur).
273. Another restriction imposed by the Service guidelines and many courts, the economic profit requirement, is beyond the scope of this Article. Several judicial doctrines, such
as "business purpose," "sham transaction," "prudent abandonment," and the Service's "cash
flow" test, have been formulated to deny participants their intended tax benefits in transactions
devoid of economic substance. This Article only attempts to classify the existing economic
substance as a lease or a sale; whether or not economic substance exists is another matter. See
Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), afJ'd in part andrev'd in part, 752
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In a net lease arrangement,2 74 the lessee

assumes responsibility for repairs, maintenance, insurance and taxes
while the lessor collects the rent. The Treasury regulations treat the
75
lessee's expenditures as an additional rent expense to the lessee

and gross income to the lessor.2 76 Accordingly, the lessor receives an
offsetting deduction for the expenses incurred by the lessee. 277 Net
leases are standard practice in an overwhelming number of varying
transactions. Any restrictions the tax law might place upon the

transfer of the net lease burdens to the lessee could be easily circumvented through increased rental charges; the allocation of these

"burdens" should not be significant in distinguishing a lease from a
sale.2

2. Condemnation Proceeds and Other Contingencies. -

Real

estate leases often contain a provision allocating the right to condem-

nation proceeds between the parties. In Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,279 for example, the Ninth Circuit implied that condemnation proceeds were important in analyzing the allocation of the
burdens and benefits of ownership regardless of the likelihood that
condemnation will occur.
F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) (transaction lacked economic substance because there was no realistic
hope for profit); Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(6) at 716.
274. In a net lease, the lessee pays all of the administrative and operative expenses of
the property, including liability and property damage insurance, maintenance, repairs, licensing and recording fees, utilities, and sales, use, property and other taxes (except for income
taxes, franchise taxes, etc.). Particular clauses may vary from lease to lease. See Fritch &
Shrank, Leveraged Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEvERAGED LEASING 211-23 (B. Fritch
& A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980).
275. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1958).
276. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(C) (1957).
277. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11 (1958).
278. The allocation of net lease burdens may have greater relevance to the lease versus
sale issue when the lessor is unable to shift the burden to the lessee through higher rent because no rent is charged at all. In Alstores Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 363 (1966),
for example, the Tax Court held there was a genuine sale and leaseback, id. at 371, where the
lease had allocated the responsibility to provide heat, electricity and water and to bear the risk
of loss to the premises from damage or destruction of the premises to the lessor. Id. at 372.
The court found that the cash passing from Alstores, the purchaser-lessor, to Steinway, the
seller-lessee, represented the price of the fee interest, less the rent due on the 2 year lease
term reserved by Steinway. Id. at 373. See also Steinway & Sons v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.
375 (1966). Had the lease-term burdens shifted to Steinway, Steinway could have been compensated by increasing the sales prices of the fee. This would have been reflected either in the
buyer's basis, and recoverable only through depreciation deductions or upon disposition of the
asset, or would more likely result in a decrease in the amount of prepaid rent included in the
lessor's income, effectively accelerating the lessee's § 162 deduction. Therefore, some attention
to the manner of allocating net lease burdens is probably warranted.
279. 544 F.2d 1045, 1047 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976).
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The Tax Court has held, however, that the allocation of condemnation proceeds to the lessor does not evidence a genuine lease
absent a prospect or expectation of condemnation. 80 In Hilton v.
Commissioner,2 81 the Tax Court correctly refused to find economic
substance in a tax shelter arrangement that allocated condemnation
proceeds to the lessor but otherwise accorded the lessor only a re-

mote prospect of economic gain.282
The added importance that the allocation of condemnation pro-

ceeds should receive in lease analysis - such as when condemnation
changes from a contingency into an expected occurence - should
also hold true for other types of contingency provisions. 283 An analysis of the allocation of these risks should follow the analysis of risk of
depreciable loss 284 if the risk is borne during the lease term. If condemnation remains a contingency, the allocation of condemnation
proceeds can only confirm the identity of the tax owner.

3. The Frank Lyon Case:
Test. -

Clouding the Economic Substance

In Frank Lyon Company v. United States, 85 the Supreme

Court listed twenty-six factors relevant to determining whether the
lessor should be permitted the depreciation deductions on the property in question. 2 6 Although the Court primarily focused its atten-

tion on distinguishing a secured mortgage loan from a purported sale
and leaseback, 28 7 some of the factors analyzed by the Court apply to
280. Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305, 359 (1980), aff'd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982).
281. Id. But see supra note 279 and accompanying text.
282. 74 T.C. 305, 359 (1980).
283. The IRS has not formally stated its position on the inclusion of an unwind clause,
which gives the lessor the right to sell the asset to the lessee if certain contingencies arise. See
Shapiro, PeripheralProblems in Leasing, in EQuiPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 104147 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman 2d ed. 1980); Committee on Depreciation & Investment Credit,
supra note 208 at 36-37. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(1)(A), at 716, may be interpreted to prohibit an unwind clause. If the contingencies covered by the unwind clause are
very unlikely to occur, Hilton's treatment of allocation of condemnation proceeds should be
followed.
284. See supra notes 219-72 and accompanying text.
285. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
286. 435 U.S. at 582-83. See also Wolfman, supra note 16, at 1086-99; Zarrow &
Gordon, Supreme Court's Sale-Leaseback Decision in Lyon Lists Multiple Criteria, 49 J.
TAX'N. 42, 43-47 (1978); Note, Taxation of Sale and Leaseback Transactions- A General
Review, supra note 16, at 977-79.
287. In sale-leaseback cases, courts must distinguish between a genuine sale-leaseback
and a disguised financing arrangement, or a tax-avoidance scheme. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); Rice's Toyota
World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th
Cir. 1985) (no business purpose for transaction aside from tax avoidance, thus, no economic
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the general lease versus sale issue. 28 8 Three of these factors are espe-

cially relevant here: (1) the presence of depreciation risk on the
lessor;289 (2) the risk of lessee default or bankruptcy; 290 and (3) the
absence of a private understanding that the lessee will exercise the
purchase option. 291
The Lyon Court evidently considered the lessor's possession of
the risk of depreciable loss to be inconsistent with a secured lender's
posture.29 2 This argument could apply equally to a lease versus sale
substance). Sale-leasebacks of real estate versus equipment may have factual differences, e.g.,
useful life, likelihood of residual value appreciation, presence of obsolescence risk, etc., but the
legal analysis is very similar. Compare, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, supra,
with Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), affd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 US. 907 (1982).
288. Apart from the three factors discussed in the text, see infra text accompanying
notes 289-91, seven of the Court's other factors are relevant to the sale versus lease question.
These are:
(i) the banking regulator's suggestion that the lessees possess a purchase option;
(2) the lessor's sole liability on the mortgage notes;
(3) the reasonableness of the rentals and option prices;
(4) the likelihood that the lessee would "walk away" from the arrangement if the
option price exceeded the then-fair market value of the building at the end of the
primary term;
(5) the lessor's "inescapable" succession to full ownership of the building if the lease
were not renewed;
(6) the arm's length nature of the transaction; and
(7) the absence of any tax rate differential to spur the transaction.
435 U.S. at 582-83.
In the wake of Lyon, courts have had to struggle with the Supreme Court's confused
articulation of the economic substance test. Most of the important cases have concerned the
validity of sale and leaseback transactions in light of Lyon's non-tax benefit test. Compare
Dunlap v. Commissioner, 670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982) (affirming Tax Court's judgment that
taxpayer could not claim loss deduction unless and until option is terminated); Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), affd per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 907 (1982) and Schaefer v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 100 (1980) (denying the
validity of a sale and leaseback) with Belz Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979),
af'd, 661 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1981) and Carroll v. Commissioner, 1978 T.C.M. (P-H) 178,173
(sustaining the validity of a sale and leaseback). See generally Rosenberg & Weinstein, supra
note 16. See also Peck v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 291 (1982) (sustaining validity of
sale and leaseback, but disallowing "excessive" rent deduction). Two sale versus lease cases
specifically have attempted to follow Lyon, both finding in favor of the taxpayer. See Kansas
City S. Ry. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 1067 (1981); Davis v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH)
1441 (1978). Kansas City S. Ry. and Davis illustrate the unworkability of the Lyon test. In
both cases, the Tax Court placed greater emphasis on the Benton-Northwest Acceptance
Corp.-Lockhart Leasing Co. subjective intent approach, despite any explicit approval of this
approach by the Lyon court.
289. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583 (1978).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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case.29 If the Court's logic in Lyon is extended, the presence of bargain renewal and purchase options2 94 would not negate the importance of the lessor's possession of the risk of depreciable loss. Where
the evidence is otherwise inconclusive, the Court implied that the
form of the transaction ought to govern. The Court concluded that
"if the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted by the parties [ought to govern]."295

Shifts of depreciable loss risk, residual value and residual value
risk, however, operate independently; the shift to the lessee of any of
the three changes the nature of the transaction. This is so because
the shift of one element eliminates the relevance of the other two.
Thus, shifting the depreciable loss risk29 to the lessee eliminates the
need to consider residual value or residual value risk where the lessor
will receive either a new or fully restored asset at the end of the
lease term. The lessee possesses the right to the residual, and therefore bears the risk of residual value fluctuation. 97 Likewise, the shift
of residual value risk to the lessee renders the analysis of residual
value and depreciable loss risk irrelevant. If the lessee possesses the
asset's residual value through the use of the asset for nearly all of its
useful life, 298 the lessee bears the risk of residual value fluctuation.
The lessor's risk of depreciable loss is irrelevant because he has
closed out his investment in the asset by accepting lease payments in
lieu of installment sale payments and has parted with equitable ownership of the property. 299 The lessor retains only the risk of obsolescence, which may also be shifted by making the lease payments
noncancellable.300
The transfer of residual value risk, as in Lyon, eliminates the
relevance of the quantum of residual value and allocation of risk of
293. Although the Lyon case involved a sale and leaseback transaction, the alternative
characterization was a mortgage loan rather than a sale. The incidence of risk of depreciable
loss is equally relevant in both settings. The underlying issue, however, is the identification of
the true owner.
294. The lease agreement in Lyon contained eight successive five year renewal options
following the 25 year primary term and a schedule of fixed price purchase options exercisable
11 years after the inception of the lease. If exercised, the purchase options would yield a
steady six percent return on the lessor's investment. Lyon, 435 U.S. at 566-567, 570.
295. Id. at 584.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 224-72.
297. See supra note 261.
298. See supra notes 184-218 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 194.
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depreciable loss. The lessee's interest in residual value appreciation
makes it probable that the lessee will ultimately obtain ownership of
the property. 30 1 A substantial residual value at the end of the lease
term, if in excess of the option price, cuts against the lessor because
it practically assures the lessee's eventual exercise of the option. Risk
of depreciable loss is irrelevant to the extent that the depreciated
value exceeds the option price. The importance of the depreciation
and obsolescence loss risk below the option price is subsumed by an
analysis of the allocation of residual value risk.
The second factor considered by the Lyon Court was the lessee's
risk of default or bankruptcy. 30 2 The Lyon Court failed to recognize
that sellers, lenders, and lessors alike face the risk of the default of
their transaction partner. Further, parties frequently protect against
these risks through various means. 30 3 These risks should not be a
distinguishing factor in analyzing a lease.
The third Lyon factor relevant to lease analysis is the absence of
an understanding between the parties that the lessee will exercise the
purchase option. 30 ' One case noted that the presence of an informal
agreement to exercise the purchase option3 5 supported the finding of
a conditional sale. It is absurd to argue, however, that a negative
implication arises from the absence of an informal agreement; this
undermines the Lyon's Court emphasis on the reasonableness of the
option price. Sensibly, no court after Lyon has emphasized the absence of an informal agreement to exercise the purchase option.
IV.

TEFRA AND ITS EFFECT ON LEASE ANALYSIS

A. Finance Leases
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA) 30 6 overhauled the safe harbor leasing rules enacted in the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) °7 Section 208 of
TEFRA repealed the 1981 safe harbor leasing provisions, which
were to go into effect September 30, 1985, and section 209(a) of
TEFRA introduced new Code section 168(f)(8), applying to leases
301. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 290.
303. See generally Leary, supra note 77, at 1072-75.
304. See supra note 291.
305. See M. & W. Gear Co. v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 841, 844 (7th Cir. 1971). See
also Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (look to substantive provisions of agreement and to parties' conduct to determine economic realities of transaction).
306. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
307. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
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entered into after December 31, 1983.308 The Tax Reform Act of
1984 postpones the effective date of the finance lease rules until

1988. Its legislative history offers three policies that support postponement: (1) deficit reduction; (2) that transactions treated as
leases should have "meaningful economic substance"; and (3) that

30 9
the tax system should not be used to freely transfer tax benefits.

The Conference Committee believes that current IRS administrative
guidelines support Congress' latter two policies, and strongly urges
the IRS not to relax those guidelines.31 0

Section 168(f)(8)(A), the heart of the new rules, introduces
substantive changes in the pre-ERTA law. 311 In a "finance lease,"
tax analysis of the lease will not consider the presence of either a
fixed price purchase option of at least ten percent of the property's

original cost, or limited use property.312 In addition, the finance lease
rules cover only "new section 38 property"31 3 and place several re-

strictions and qualifications on what constitutes finance lease property. 314 The most severe restrictions are the mandatory ratable
spread of the investment credit over five years, 31 5 and the limitation

of finance leases to no more than forty percent of qualified
property. 31 6

Congress went only half the distance towards returning to the
308. New § 168(f)(8)(A) (Supp. 1 1983) reads as follows:
(8) Special rules for finance leases(A) In general.-For purposes of this title, except as provided in subsection (i), in
the case of any agreement with respect to any finance lease property, the fact that(i) a lessee has the right to purchase the property at a fixed price which is not less
than 10 percent of the original cost of the property to the lessor, or
(ii) the property is of a type not readily usable by any person other than the lessee,
shall not be taken into account in determining whether such agreement is a lease.
309. SENATE FIN. COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D Sass., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT of 1984, ExPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITrEE ON MARCH 21, 1984, S. PRT. No.
169, at 109 (1984). See also General Explanation, supra note 40, at 12-18.
310. H. REP. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 772, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1445, 1459-60.
311. See supra note 308.
312. Id.
313. I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(B)(i) (Supp. 1 1983).
314. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(B)-(E) (West Supp. 1985) (defining and limiting "finance
lease property").
315. I.R.C. § 168(i)(2) (West Supp. 1985). This restriction is due to expire October 1,
1989. See I.R.C. § 168(i)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
316. I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1985). This restriction will expire on December 31, 1989. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(8)(B)(ii)(I) (West Supp. 1985).
Another restriction set to expire in 1989 is found in § 168(i)(1) (West Supp. 1985). This
subsection prohibits a finance lessor from reducing his tax liability by more than 50%; the
restriction expires September 30, 1989. See I.R.C. § 168(i)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
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economic substance test as the guiding principle in lease analysis by
failing to outline the key elements of "economic substance." This is
bound to make judicial application of the finance lease rules haphazard.3 17 Furthermore, the finance lease rules do not apply in many
situations,3 18 and there is uncertainty and disagreement as to
whether they are elective.31 9 Courts may scrutinize other lease provisions more carefully or may treat section 168(f)(8)(A) as an inviolable safe harbor; nevertheless, courts will be forced to develop more
definitive working criteria for economic substance analysis.
B.

The Need for Reform

The economic substance test in the tax analysis of leases has
two functions: (1) to distinguish leases from sales, which require
realization and recognition of gain under section 1001, and from
317. The House Conference Report offers this synopsis of the state of the law to guide
courts in applying the new finance leasing rules:
Finance leases must meet the requirements for lease treatment under nonsafe harbor rules, disregarding the fact that the lease contains a 10-percent fixed price
purchase option or that the property is limited use property. Thus, the transaction
must have economic substance independent of tax benefits and not merely be cast in
the form of a lease for purposes of utilizing the lessor's tax base. The lessor must
reasonably expect to derive a profit from the transaction independent of tax benefits.
In addition to a profit, the transaction must not (without regard to the fact the
agreement contains a fixed price option or that the property is limited use property)
in substance be a financing arrangement or conditional sale in which the lessee has
an investment in the property.
H. CON. R. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 490, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1190, 1268.
318. Examples of situations in which the finance lease rules do not apply are: (1) leased
property that does not meet the definition of "finance lease property," § 168(f)(8)(B) (Vest
Supp. 1985); (2) leases that do not contain purchase options of at least 10% of the property's
original cost and cover property other than limited use property, § 168(f(8)(A) (Supp. I
1983); and (3) leases between nonqualifying individuals. See §§ 168(f)(8)(B)(iv)(IV), (V);
168(f)(8)(C)(i); 168(f)(8)(D) (West Supp. 1985); H. CON. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 489-92, reprinted in US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1190, 1268-70.
The requirement that the lessor should reasonably expect to derive a profit, independent
of tax benefits, is a sound proposition, but stricter than the current case law. The Joint Committee report cited Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), affd per curiam, 671 F.2d
316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982), as authority on the question, but in Dunlap
v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), the Tax Court found that a "realistic hope of material
economic (nontax) gain from the investment" was sufficient, id. at 1437, thus retreating from
the Hilton position.
319. Compare Mount, The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 - Safe
Harbor Lease Provisions Corralled, But Still Alive and Kicking, 60 TAxEs 707, 718 (1982)

(finance lease provisions are not elective) with Committee on Depreciation & Investment
Credit, supra note 208 at 9-11. The Association's report states that although the Treasury is
considering instituting a filing requirement to qualify under the finance lease rules, the Treasury is unwilling to state that the finance lease rules are elective. Id. at 10.
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loans, where the principal transfers are not taxable events; and (2) to
prevent taxpayer election of deductions under either section
162(a)(3) or section 167 by merely switching the label of the transaction. Present tax analysis often fails to accommodate these dual

goals. Consistent results, however, may be achieved by application of
the economic substance test.
1. Competitive Neutrality. - Safe harbor leasing was originally
designed to achieve competitive neutrality. 320 The goal of competi-

tive neutrality Auerbach3

21 -

a phrase popularized by Professors Warren and

is to spread the tax benefits generated by accelerated

depreciation and the investment tax credit to corporations that lack
sufficient taxable income to otherwise absorb those benefits.322 However, Congressional efforts under ERTA, and subsequently, TEFRA,
to achieve competitive neutrality, and thus correct the distortive effects of ACRS and the ITC have failed because Congress has not

fully articulated ACRS and ITC's underlying policy rationales.323
Therefore, Congress has been unable to identify the parties adversely

affected by ACRS and the ITC. Furthermore, safe harbor leasing
has allowed Congress to disguise its intended legislative agenda,
whereas other methods of achieving competitive neutrality would

force Congress to articulate its perception of the problem.
320. Safe harbor leasing was beset by problems from the outset. One of its chief
problems was a funneling of nearly one quarter of the tax benefits made available by safe
harbor leasing to the lessor and third parties and a lessening of taxpayer confidence in the tax
system. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMI. ON TAX'N, supra note 15, at 23-27. At a 12% discount rate, the Committee reports that 76.5% of the tax benefits subject to safe harbor leasing
went to the seller-lessee. Id. at 24 (Table 3). See also Lubick & Galper, The Defects of Safe
Harbor Leasing and What to Do About Them, 14 TAX NOTES 643, 647 (1982) (criticizing the
leasing mechanism because it confuses the public about what is transpiring and involves high
third-party costs).
321. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 51, at 1762-74, 1785-86.
322. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 51, at 1758-62.
323. Professors Warren and Auerbach cite two possible rationales for ACRS and the
ITC. One rationale is that Congress sought to exempt income taxation on capital income. Id.
at 1756-57. Nevertheless, a corrective mechanism would only be necessary for "start-up" companies, since "loss" companies are already effectively exempt from income tax. Id. at 1759-61.
Secondly, it is suggested that ACRS and the ITC are subsidies to encourage investment in
capital assets by lowering the after-tax cost of recovery property. Under this rationale, a corrective mechanism is needed to neutralize the competitive advantage that wealthy taxpayers
would obtain over loss and start-up companies. Id. at 1758-59.
In addition, Professors Warren and Auerbach cite two reasons for extending these subsi,dies to loss and start-up companies. First, they argue that economic welfare will suffer if the
subsidies do not flow to companies engaged in the most socially desirable investment activity.
Id. at 1761. Second, non-neutrality would lead to tax-induced mergers possibly disadvantageous to the economy. Id. at 1761.
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Professors Warren and Auerbach describe three ways to achieve
"competitive neutrality". 324 Where the goal is to equalize the aftertax cost of capital of all corporate taxpayers investing in similar assets, 32 5 competitive neutrality would have to be achieved by transferring the benefits of ACRS, the ITC, and related interest expenses so
that loss companies could benefit to the same extent as profit companies. 326 Professors Warren and Auerbach demonstrate that the tax
benefits transferred under safe harbor leasing are inadequate to ac327
complish the desired result.
Alternatively, competitive neutrality can be viewed as a means
of equalizing access to tax benefits, which are subsidies to investors
in capital assets.3 28 One way to equalize the subsidy would be to
transfer tax reductions from ACRS and the ITC in excess of true
economic depreciation.3 29 The loss company beneficiary would
thereby receive the same government subsidy for capital investment
as profitable companies. Another way to equalize the subsidy would
be to transfer the excess of ACRS deductions over the pre-1981 de-0
33
preciation system known as Asset Depreciation Range (ADR).
Some commentators who have adopted this position would also include the ITC as part of the subsidy element even though the ITC
predates the 1981 legislation.33 1
The timing of the introduction of safe harbor leasing implies
that Congress adopted the latter approach. The absence of a designated mechanism to transfer the excess tax benefits created by ADR
and the ITC over economic depreciation, offers some evidence, if
only by negative implication, that Congress was concerned with the
fair allocation of the additionalbenefits created by ACRS. If this is
accurate, the subsequent enactment of I.R.C. § 48(q) has decreased
the need for a tax benefit transfer mechanism by reducing the com332
bined tax benefits of ACRS and the ITC.
If capital cost equalization is the congressional goal, Congress
324.

Id. at 1768-72.

325. Id. at 1768-69.
326. Id. at 1768.
327. Id. at 1769.
328. Id, at 1769-71.
329. Id,
330. Id, at 1771. ADR was the primary method of asset depreciation before ACRS. See
Treas, Reg. § 1.167(a)-lI (1977); Rev. Proc. 77-10, 1977-1 C.B. 548.
331. See Lubick & Galper, supra note 320, at 645-46.
332. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1585. I.R.C. § 48(q) (West 1984 & Supp.
1985) usually lowers the ACRS asset basis by one-half of the ITC.
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might be more effective by focusing on the net operating loss carryover rules. 333 Under current law, a company with a net operating
loss can carry excess deductions backward or forward to years of
profitable operation. 334 Tax law, however, fails to account for the loss
due to the time value of money that occurs when a taxpayer must
postpone a deduction several years into the future. 33 Instead of cumbersome, inefficient leasing mechanisms, I.R.C. sections 46(b) and
17236 could be amended to provide that unused ITC, depreciation
and interest deductions will grow at a compounded rate of interest
until absorption.337 Companies incapable of utilizing the carryover
before expiration due to perpetual unprofitability would not be entitled to capital cost equalization.
Either capital cost or subsidy equilization can also be achieved
through refundability or transferability of tax benefits. Under a system of refundability, the government would issue a check in the
amount of the subsidy directly to the qualifying corporation.338 An
explicit transferability system would allow the corporation to sell the
tax benefits to a buyer without transferring ownership in the underlying asset.33 9 In safe harbor leasing, by contrast, the parties enter
into a fictitious sale and leaseback to transfer tax ownership to the
tax benefit purchaser. The buyer-lessor's downpayment on the
purchase price is usually the only cash to change hands, and constitutes the actual transfer of tax benefits.3 40 The lease and loan terms
coincide and usually extend well beyond the recovery period of the
asset. Rent and loan payments are set at the same amount, and the
lessor ends up with a tax loss on the transaction equal to his
34
downpayment. 1
333. See I.R.C. § 172 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
334. Under § 172(b) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985), the maximum carryback period is
three years, and the maximum carryforward is 15 years. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A), (B) (West
Supp. 1985).

335. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.172-4, 6 (1984) (explaining and illustrating the net operating
loss carryover rules).
336. See I.R.C. § 46(b) (1982) (providing that unused investment tax credits may be
carried back three years and forward seven years) (current version at I.R.C. § 46(b) (West
Supp. 1985)); I.R.C. § 172 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
337. Deductions in a net operating loss year could be prorated between current absorption and the net operating loss amount. The identity of the depreciation and interest components of the net operating loss could be traced until absorbed in a future year's income.
338. See Lubick & Galper, supra note 320, at 645.
339. Id.
340. Warren & Auerbach, supra note 51, at 1763-66. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. §
5c.168(f)(8)-I (1981).
341. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 5c.168(f)(8)-I (1981).
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2. The Failure of the Finance Lease Rules. - The finance lease
rules are a compromise between the goals of competitive neutrality
and restoring economic substance as the guidepost for lease analysis;
however, the compromise appears likely to fail on both fronts.
The goal of restoring economic substance as the standard governing leasing transactions will probably not be achieved by enactment of the finance lease rules. First, the new law affords lease status to a lease that contains a fixed price purchase option or involves
limited use property, even though the lease more closely resembles a
sale. 342 Secondly, Congress was too vague in defining economic substance other than by general references to Service guidelines under
Revenue Procedure 75-21. 3 1 The guidelines, however, do not represent current law; technically, they are safe harbors for parties
seeking the Service's acquiescence to their lease characterization.
Moreover, strict adherence to the Service guidelines on aspects of
the economic substance test not addressed- by Congress will be impossible due to the Service's inconsistent criteria.344 The content and
application of the economic substance test will be left to judicial
imagination.
The value of finance leasing to the goal of competitive neutrality
will depend upon which conception of competitive neutrality Congress desires to adopt, and upon the Service's willingness to revise its
guidelines to incorporate the finance lease rules.345 The guidelines
currently require the lessor to show a pretax profit on the lease
transaction, by calculating the lessee's aggregate rental payments
and the lessor's residual interest in the property, and subtracting the
342.

See supra notes 308 & 312 and accompanying text. Curiously, the legislative his-

tory of TEFRA offers no explanation for the departure from the Service guidelines on fixed
price purchase options and limited use property. See H. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
489-92, reprinted in 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 1190, 1268-70. Professors Warren

and Auerbach note that finance leases were a creation of the Conference Committee, which
explains the lack of a statement in the Senate Finance Committee report. See Warren &
Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1583 & nn.31 & 32.
343.

See, S. REP, No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132-33, 139, reprinted in 1982 US.
& AD. NEws 781, 895-97, 903.

CODE CONG.

344. For example, the rule that the lessor must maintain at least a 20% at risk investment in the property, see Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(1)(A), at 715, is incompatible
with a 10% purchase option. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1587.
345. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 52, at 1587. They estimate that the tax benefit transfer potential of finance leases will be nearly equal to the original safe harbor leases;

their conclusions, however, are optimistic and admittedly speculative. Id. at 1587-88. Further,
the finance lease rules do not "effectively implement a coherent concept of competitive neutrality." Id. at 1589.
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lessor's expenses.346 The lessee's minimum rental payments will be
smaller and the lessee's benefit transfer larger if the Service looks to
the residual interest when calculating the lessor's profit, and ignores
the option price. Conversely, if the Service only considers the option
price when calculating the lessor's profit, the lessee's tax benefit
transfer will decrease. The latter method is more accurate since the
lessor has parted with his economic interest in the residual value in
excess of the option price.
Congress can more effectively achieve the goals of competitive
neutrality and restoration of the economic substance test. The finance lease rules should be repealed and replaced with either a direct tax benefit transfer system that does not intrude on the leasing
rules, or a refundability system.347 Furthermore, Congress or the
Treasury should define the criteria for lease status according to the
transaction's economic substance. 348 The economic substance test,
properly defined, will provide the most effective means for distinguishing a lease from a sale.

346. Rev. Proc. 75-21, supra note 67, § 4(6), at 716.
347. See Warren & Auerbach, supra note 51, at 1772-79.
348. Other commentators agree on the need for a comprehensive approach. See, e.g.,
Park, Tax Characterizationof International Leases: The Contours of Ownership, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 103, 175-80 (1981) (recommending comprehensive, uniform international rules
on tax characterization of leases borrowed from the accounting profession in modified form);

Leary, supra note 77, at 1064, 1107-12 (recommending sui generis treatment of leasing in
commercial law).
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